Two updates By Col R Hariharan (retd.)

Two updates By Col R Hariharan (retd.)

1)Sri Lanka: Fernandopulle's Assassination Likely to Trigger Fresh Offensive-Update No 136

2)Sri Lanka: Two Unhealthy Political Developments - Part I- Legitimising the TMVP – Update No. 135

By Col R Hariharan (retd.)

Note no. 43707-Apr.-2008

SRI LANKA: Fernandopulle's Assassination Likely to Trigger Fresh Offensive-Update No 136
By Col R Hariharan (retd.)
Assassination of Fernandopulle
The assassination of Sri Lanka Highways Minister and Chief Government whip Jeyaraj Fernandopulle (55) by a suicide bomb blast at Gampaha district on Sunday
(April 6) morning has deprived the President Rajapaksa of his point's man in the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). The minister was killed along with 11 others
when he was flagging off a marathon race as part of the Sinhala (and Tamil) New Year's Day celebration at Weliweriya. Over 95 others were injured in the blast.
A voluble and assertive personality, the minister had been active in setting up things for the ruling alliance to contest the eastern provincial council elections slated for
May 10. The President will be sorely missing his services during the PC election as also in handling the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), which is a loose
canon in the political firmament, after the elections.
Fernandopulle had been high on the hit list of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for his strong anti-LTTE stance. He minced no words against them in his
speeches. So it is logical to conclude that his assassination was the handiwork of the LTTE. Even the assassination of D.M.Dasanayake, Minister of Nation Building,
carried out on January 9, 2008 is believed to have been a case of mistaken identity as Jeyaraj Fernandopulle was intended to be the target. However, this time the
assassin made no such mistake. .
A four-time parliament member Fernandopulle had created an indispensable niche for himself within the SLFP. He was one of the few Tamil ministers who could
fluently speak Sinhala and English as well. A no-holds-barred speaker, Fernandopulle was well known for his blunt statements that caused red faces in diplomatic and
political circles, and in the corridors of power.
The President is unlikely to let the LTTE get away with the assassination of his right hand man. We can expect him to unleash the security forces in full force once
again on the LTTE forward defences in Mannar, Madhu church, Omanthai, Welioya and Muhamalai areas. In any case, the ground indications already point to the
imminence of resumption of offensive by the security forces and the LTTE's readiness to face them. The killing of the minister is likely to only hasten the process.
Operational picture
Abnormally heavy rains had bogged down the operations in the north so far. The troops deployed near large water bodies in Mannar, Muhamalai, Nagarkovil,
Welioya areas have been affected by flooding and slush. This had impeded air and artillery support and defences were waterlogged. Mosquitoes breeding in puddles
of water have spread dengue and chikungunia among troops. This is reported to have severely affected operational capability of security forces in Welioya sector
along the eastern coast.
Despite the rains during the last month, the SLA had claimed some progress in their creeping offensive after inflicting heavy casualties on the LTTE. On March 21,
2008, the Media Centre for National Security spokesman has claimed killing 6,867 LTTE cadres so far in the operations that commenced in December 2005. As
against this, the security forces had lost 1,501 troops in action. The casualty claim at end February 2008 stood at a total of 6,486 LTTE cadres, and 1,196 military
personnel. These figures could be inflated or include civilian auxiliaries and need to be confirmed by other sources. However, the Media Centre figures indicate a
sudden escalation in the security forces casualty - 305 troops killed in the four weeks of March 2008) as against a total of 1196 troops lost in the earlier period of 24
months! Moreover, as against the security forces loss of 305 the LTTE had suffered 386 casualties in the same period. This is an alarmingly low ratio between the
two, achieved never before.
This shows the combat along the front line even during the rains had really heated up. And as the operations intensify further now and all the heavy fire power is
brought in, casualties on both sides are likely to mount rapidly. But despite this, the security forces are undoubtedly better placed. Considering the overall size of the
security forces, their casualties are comparatively much less than that of the LTTE which has been mauled severely (though not grievously), losing at least 30 per cent
of its strength..
During the last one week the rains have tapered off and the weather has improved. Thus assured air and heavy artillery support should now be available for
operations. Similarly, ground conditions should have improved for the using armour without the fear of getting bogged down in slush. The trickle of civilians vacating
the battle zones is growing. For the last few days the security forces were being moved forward in Jaffna Peninsula perhaps to get ready for a fresh offensive. We can
expect it to start sooner than later.
The LTTE also appears to be gearing itself for the offensive to resume. Three groups including the Malathi and Charles Anthony brigades have been moved to Madhu
Church area in the Mannar Sector, according to deserters. Both sides had agreed to keep the church and its vicinity a no war zone. However both sides have been
trading accusations of the other side using the holy ground to launch artillery fire. And fierce fighting had been raging for sometime now within a kilometre vicinity of
the church.
The Bishop of Mannar Rayappu Joseph has informed that in order to save the idol of Our Lady of Madhu from artillery fire, the church management had shifted the
idol to a safe location on April 4.
It is evident that the idol has been moved to the northern most part of the LTTE held territory at the behest of the LTTE. The escalating the combat situation in the
area around Madhu Church is probably operational. The church is located astride the supply routes from Mannar coast to Wanni. So it is vital for the LTTE to
defend it fiercely. It is equally important for the security forces to wrest control of the area. So we can expect the LTTE to fight it out when the offensive resumes in
this area.
Both sides appear to be preparing for a long haul. Media reports indicate that Sri Lanka had asked Pakistan for the immediate supply of 150,000 rounds of 60 mm
mortar bombs and hand grenades. Pakistan is likely to fulfil another Sri Lankan order worth $ 25 million for the supply of 81 mm, 120 mm and 130 mm mortar
bombs. The LTTE also appears to have received from some ammunition, particularly for its artillery. It is not clear which clandestine route is being used by the LTTE
to import the munitions. But the Indian coastal zone continues to be the weakest link in the naval defence of Sri Lanka. We may expect the Sri Lanka navy to
intensify operations in the seas around Katchativu in the coming weeks. This could trigger further tensions in both India and Sri Lanka. This is in the nature of war
which always triggers tension in both winners and losers.
(Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence. He is
associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies.

Note no. 436 07-Apr.-2008

Sri Lanka: Two Unhealthy Political Developments - Part I- Legitimising the TMVP – Update No. 135
Col R Hariharan (retd.)
Political developments in Sri Lanka have been as rapid as the abnormal deluge that has bogged down the troops in the forward lines of north. There had been some
realignment of political fronts as the country approached the May 10 deadline for the first ever provincial council elections in the east since the de-merger of the north
-eastern province. Ideally this should be a healthy development. But Sri Lanka, like many other democracies in the neighbourhood, is caught in the vortex of populist
politics, and disregard for scruples in the quest for power among political parties. The battle array of the two fronts reflects s this politics sans principles with focus on
issues of power rather than commitment to ideals.
Specifically, two unhealthy but interconnected political developments that could become hazardous for national security are evident in this political exercise. The first
and more insidious development is legitimisation of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Padaigal (TMVP) as a political party without disarming it and anointing it as a partner
of the ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA). The second is the potential powder keg of growing feeling of alienation among Muslims in the east in the
emerging provincial political dispensation.
Legitimising the TMVP
TMVP has a murky history that is almost wholly militant and non-political. It is a product of miscegenation of soured militancy and failed quest for power through the
use of arms. It owes its origins to Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna (to be factually correct a.k.a Kokila Dushmantha Gunawardena), the Batticaloa leader
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who broke up with Prabhakaran in March 2004. The LTTE's major preoccupation in the early years of Karuna's exit
was typical – to gun him and his followers down. Karuna made a half hearted attempt at politics. This was apparently beyond his ken as surviving LTTE pistol group
assassins became the top priority. Ultimately this preoccupation became a zero sum game that ended any political role for him. But it provided Karuna and the TMVP
a legitimate (at least from their point of view) reason to retain the arms they had brought along when they quit the LTTE fold. In any case, the state had neither the
inclination nor the determination to disarm yet another Tamil militant group in its own back yard, particularly when it was fighting the LTTE with the TMVP assisting it
to effectively curb the LTTE activity.
Karuna became a war lord of sorts ruling the Tamil areas. The cadres helped the Sri Lankan military operations that intensified from 2005 onwards. Initially they
operated collectively in groups and later individually. They occupied the power vacuum created amidst the Tamil population as the territory was cleared of LTTE
control. Karuna had problems in visibly exercising his command mainly due to absentee landlordism and continued LTTE threat to his life. The effective leadership
power was wielded by Pillayan, his second in command. The security forces appear to have preferred him as he was eager, willing and available to go along with the
security forces operations. Pillayan climbed up to the top of the leadership ladder after the TMVP eased out Karuna from the leadership making some accusations of
financial misappropriation of party funds against him.
The TMVP activities were not endearing them to others. Their actions related more to a vigilante militia than a political party. There were innumerable complaints
against the behaviour of armed TMVP cadres roaming around the Tamil and at times Muslim areas from many quarters. They included Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission, the four co-chairs of the Tokyo Donors Conference, political parties of all hues, community leaders, civil society organisations, highly reputed international
and local not for profit organisations, and human rights and humanitarian organs of the United Nations.
The list of TMVP misconduct included the whole range of offences in the penal code - extortion, child recruitment, 'tax collection,' kidnapping, intimidation, muzzling
the media, and even killings. There were accusations of army colluding with TMVP in some of these actions either by ignoring or participating in the misdeeds.
Demands for disarming the TMVP were as loud as the deadly silence of the government response to the demands. The Sri Lanka government had to take some
action to satisfy the mounting international criticism against the TMVP and probably Karuna, now without power and following, became probably a willing fall guy.
The TMVP without Karuna but under Pillayan became an important partner of the UPFA alliance when it contested the local body polls in Batticaloa district a month
ago. Of course, the elections were by and large peaceful and polling was heavy. The TMVP cadres did not display their hardware during the elections according to
the government. This point has been disputed by some of the political parties and civil society bodies. That is immaterial because the TMVP still retains the weapons.
TMVP won eight of the nine local bodies. The UPFA alliance won the ninth - the Batticaloa council. The government show-cased the local body elections to the
international audience as the coming of age of democracy in the east. In a way it was a coming of age, but of politicisation of extremism. This is where the genuineness
and credibility of the forthcoming PC polls hang now.
The issue is not simply one of legitimising TMVP; but legitimising extrajudicial role of armed groups to operate politically in areas of their choosing, while the rule of
law is consigned to the books. Though the TMVP might be more inclined to assume a political role, it has to disarm itself to become a legitimate political party as
other Tamil militant groups had done in the past. Only that would be an affirmation of its faith in the power of the ballot rather than the bullet. Even in Nepal, the
Maoist arms were mothballed before they participated in the elections.
The memories of letting loose armed gangs in the east after the Indian peace Keeping Force (IPKF) left the island in 1990 provide a gruesome lesson for the state in
handling the issue casually. The east was handed over to the LTTE control by a clever President Premadasa to lay the rule of law on the then Chief Minister
Varadaraja Perumal who had made a misguided unilateral declaration of independence for the northeast in his last hurrah. The LTTE went on a rampage and in the
blood bath that followed it killed at least a thousand Tamil youth who had put their faith in the government.
The bottom line is security of ordinary people is the responsibility of the state. It cannot deputise it to warlords or irregular militias. If the state cannot ensure personal
security, how can it conduct free and fair elections in the true democratic spirit? History is replete with examples of how politics and guns in a democracy cannot
coexist.. Pakistan in our own neighbourhood has been sapped of its strength due to not adhering to this simple truth. It is still reaping the bitter fruits of ignoring a
simple basic dictum - only politics and not guns can have a place in democracy.
A second aspect is such moves set a bad precedence in future negotiations for peace with the LTTE. Ultimately the future of the armed LTTE cadres has to be
decided. Even during the IPKF's early palaver with the LTTE, the cadres' future was discussed. If they are to retain their arms, they have to be part of a legitimate
force of the state accountable to the organs of the constitution. From this count, this political move to take TMVP within the UPFA fold without disarming it could
weaken state's case in future negotiations as and when they take place with LTTE (no harm in hoping I suppose). It also sends the message that as long as such
extremist groups maintain their identity and remain politically useful they can get away with anything and exist outside the pale of law.
The only regime that had been practising such black tactics is Burma where the military junta has signed ceasefire agreements with a large number of ethnic insurgent
groups. They have been allowed to retain their structure, put on a state retainer, and act as government proxies in their regions with detrimental results. A few
powerful groups have been allowed to retain their arms and they are virtually ruling the roost. A few other groups are into profitable poppy cultivation and have
become bastions of drug traffic causing concern to both China and the rest of the world. These groups have encouraged illegal arms traffic to feed insurgencies in
India's northeast and Bangladesh.
Sri Lanka is politically far more advanced than Burma to fall into such easy but risky subterfuge in handling the TMVP. A suspicion that the removal of Special Task
Force (STF) personnel from 10 posts before the election was carried out at the behest of the TMVP persists in the minds of many commentators. If this is true it is an
unhealthy beginning for the new "political role" of the TMVP. With Pillayan already speaking of his aspirations to be chief minister of the eastern provincial council
(and why not if he wins majority seats!) the credibility of the government exercise in "liberating the people of the east from LTTE control" and ushering in democracy
would be low. One can only hope at least after the elections are over, the disarming of TMVP would follow. It is never too late to start what is good for the people.
Lastly, there is the global threat of small arms proliferation in which insurgent and militant groups' contribution is at least a million weapons. In South Asia alone at least
100,000 to 200,000 are in the hands of insurgent groups, past and present. This figure does not include weapons in the hands of criminal gangs. Sri Lanka has a
sizeable contribution to the stockpile of such unaccounted arms that are floating in the sub continent. This encourages a host of crimes – smuggling, corruption of
government officials, human traffic, and illicit arms and drug traffic. The pilot survey of the Hambantota district by the National Commission Against Illicit Proliferation
of Small Arms Sri Lanka has clearly shown how the illicit weapons from north and east are contributing to crime even in a Sinhala majority district. So how can there
be normal political life in the east, with illicit arms in the hands of legitimately elected representatives? Only the people of Sri Lanka can answer this question.
(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-
90.He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. )