''Victory day not far off''-Gen.Sarath Fonseka
Last modified on: 7/21/2008 4:58:46 PM
Agreeing that the national problem could only be solved through political means, the Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka said that not
only Tamils but also Sinhalese and the Muslims need political solutions to solve some of their problems.
He said that the political solution should be completely different from what the LTTE and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) were clamouring
for. Their ultimate goal is to destroy Sinhalese as was revealed by the 'Eelam Pandiyan' cadres, who had surrendered earlier."
They admitted that they were motivated by the LTTE during their training period not only to kill the Sinhalese soldiers but also the Sinhalese people as well".The Army Commander said that numerous problems faced by the innocent Tamils in the North and East due to LTTE terrorism would not be solved by making R. Sampanthan or someone else the Prime Minister of the so-called Eelam.
Welcoming President Mahinda Rajapaksa's invitation to the LTTE to resume peace talks provided they lay down their arms, the Army chief assured that the Army's forward march to liberate Wanni would continue without any hindrance.
Commenting on recent allegation on the attack on the media, Lt. Gen. Fonseka said that he has a huge military arm with a strength of over 162, 000 men who have been trained to kill but not to assault.
"Certain media personnel, who have been misled by certain disgruntled military officials, do not write in the interest of the people and the country. How can they demand media freedom when they do not follow basic ethics", he queried.
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* LTTE's route to ferry across ordnance is blocked with the capture of Vidathalathivu.
* Some more LTTE controlled areas to be captured before NCP elections.
* President and the government will no doubt deserve the credit for the military victories.
* LTTE avoid confrontations with the military to minimize their casualties.
* LTTE have lost over 9,000 cadres in the last two years and 3000 have been forcibly conscripted.
* LTTE Leader Prabhakaran is good as dead and is too old to command a terrorist outfit.
* Prabhakaran's true nature shows when he kills unarmed civilians whenever defeat stares at his face.
Army never had an overall strategy earlier to fight and capture LTTE controlled areas.
The strength of the Sri Lanka Army has risen from 118,000 to 162,000, with a reserve of 12,000 well trained soldiers in the North.
The Army was not responsible for the attack on Keith Noyair.
Some disgruntled high ranking military officials provide misleading information to the media.
Top Army officers are frustrated because their personal welfare is not looked after at the expense of Army welfare.
Officers who ran away from Mullaithivu, Kilinochchi and Elephant Pass battle fronts are senior Generals in the Army now today.
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Excerpts: Q: What is the strategic importance of Vidathalativu and what would be the impact on the LTTE which had lost its main Sea Tiger base after
18 years of control?
A: Vidathalathivu was a major Sea Tiger base in the Western coast, where most of the sea operations of the LTTE were launched. They maintained this base to smuggle in arms and ammunition from India via the Mannar islands.
Now all their operations in the West are blocked and have to operate from Nachchikuda side, where the movements are quite difficult. The main thrust has now reached very close to Thunukai. The Kokkadival and Kadavan have to be captured to protect the Western flank.
Q: But the Opposition has claimed, that Vidathalativu, was abandoned by the LTTE some weeks ago and now dominated by the military, has
become a show piece to get political mileage during the forthcoming North Central Provincial elections?
A: I feel the Opposition must be conducting some reconnaissance missions in these areas. The military is no doubt entitled to get a political
mileage especially after capturing areas like Vidathalathivu and Mannar.
Most probably we will capture many more places before the elections. Are they expecting us to sit and wait until the elections are over? We
would like to know who the people are keep monitoring our movements from their houses.
Q: They also claim that the Army helps the government to take political mileage through some of these military victories. How do you see these
allegations?
A: The President of the country being the Commander in Chief is entitled to get the credit for all these military victories. He is the one who
takes decisions and responsibilities of launching these major offensives. Wars are launched by the governments and credit of its success will
naturally go to the government and not to the Opposition.
Do they expect the Army to lose these battles and face reversals? So, then the credit will not go to the government like what had happened in
the past.
Q: You have set deadlines to capture Wanni in the past and also gave an assurance of a turning point in August. Is the military ready to go for
this target now or do you have to reset another time-frame?
A: No, I never gave specific deadlines as such but what I said was that I will here to capture Wanni during my tenure of office. And, I never said as to when I will be finishing my term. That depends on how long the President wants me to serve. I will do my best to finish it within a
reasonable time.
I don't think any layman would ever think of capturing such a massive area killing 8,000 to 9,000 terrorists in the process within an year. We captured Vidathalathivu and the troops have advanced 3kms within a day.
In Chirandikulam we killed 25 terrorists few weeks ago. Now we have seven km north of Chiraddikulam and three km in the south of Thunukkai.
The changes are taking place in the battle fronts. The Army could not move even 100 metres further up and we fought for months to inch forward. But now the troops are getting into a faster mode. We had only 12 casualties last week whereas those days there used to over 40
soldiers who get killed.
Now they do not confront us as earlier, where we were able to kill more than 150 terrorists a week. Last week only 15 terrorists were killed.
The LTTE is avoiding confrontations with us as they do not want to suffer high number of casualties. They have now changed their way of confronting us.
Q: Isn't this pattern changing because that they are facing a severe shortage of manpower?
A: Yes, that has resulted to a greater extent. They have lost over 9,000 in the last two years. The number of cadres were killed in the East was over 2,000, then over 1,000 in Jaffna, 3,000 in Wanni, over 2,000 in Mannar, and over 1,000 in Weli Oya. The Air Force has killed about a
1,000 and the Navy has killed 329. These official figures were officially released at the last Security Council meeting.
The total number of casualties is very high. According to intelligence there are over 5,000 cadres in the North including their political cadres, home guards in bunkers and Nadeshan's cadres. The LTTE has recruited over 3,000 people forcibly. The quality of their fighting has
deteriorated.
In addition to the shortage of manpower, the LTTE lacks leaders, after the death of their so called leaders, Anton Balasingham, Tamilselvam and Balaraj. Prabakaran is as good as dead and is too old to lead a terrorist outfit. Normally terrorist leaders are aggressive and young
people. So the LTTE is fighting a losing battle while the Sri Lankan military is becoming stronger day by day.
Q: According to a certain media, the number of LTTE cadres killed is different from the figures that you give. So some claim that it is a numbers game to continue with the war. What do you have to say ?
A: The Army gets these numbers from our intelligence by listening to the LTTE transmissions. After every confrontation, the LTTE updates these numbers and they are not decided by the Army.
In Vidathalathivu, the LTTE has lost over 30 terrorists and these numbers are confirmed by their transmissions. People who claim that this is a numbers game are the ones who believe that the terrorists, and also have more faith in the LTTE than the Sri Lankan Army.
Q: You have said that the LTTE's days are numbered. How confident are you that you can eliminate the LTTE before the end of your tenure?
A: Yes, why I say that their days are numbered is by comparing what had happened during the last two years. In the last two years they have lost territories, the East and now Mannar. Over 1,200 square km area in the North have now been captured. This same trend was there for
two years when we liberated the East and the same will followed until we capture the North.
LTTE has lost two thirds of its manpower and a large stock of weapons including 2,500 rifles and other heavy weapons. They are running out of arms now. As the fighting is going round the clock the LTTE could not remain without ammunition and weapons to face us. So, I don't think
that the LTTE can keep pace with this schedule. It is an impossible task for them.
Q: How do you assess the input of the intelligence services? Are they more efficient than it was some years ago?
A: Yes, at the moment they are doing a tremendous job. In the past when we were in the field we did not have confidence in their services.
They were actually doing basically, 'post mortems' on the movements of terrorists and how their planned attack.
Now the situation has changed and we can rely on them who give us accurate intelligence information on terrorist activities, their strength and possible actions that they may resort to. We revamped the intelligence services with some important changes.
Q: Innocent people in Yala still come under LTTE attacks. Why has the military failed to capture the LTTE terrorists who have a free run in Yala?
A: It is a long 90 km stretch of jungle terrain, with a width of 40 km from Yala to Kanchikuddichchiaru in the Eastern Province towards
Ampara. The group which had shot at the bus was the same group that had fired at the Army patrol in Panama about a month ago.
They have used the same weapons this time as well. When they are defeated they use very cheap tactics under the instructions of Prabhakaran, who has never being humane. After the Army clears the Kanchikuddichchi area, the STF will set up new camps in this area to
deter them. We have already taken steps with the STF to hunt them.
Q: You have taken part in almost all the major military operations in the last 25 years. Where do you think that we had failed and why?
A: We had failed due to many reasons. The main reason was the Army did not have an overall strategy to fight and capture the LTTE controlled areas. We were only going for very limited operations. We launched offensives without aiming to capture Jaffna and there were no plans to liberate the East.
We commenced operation 'Jayasikuru' and fought for three years without a proper plan to eliminate LTTE cadres from that area. We merely captured camps. We were limited only to certain operations like the rescue of Jaffna Fort or the Elephant Pass. The Army started Eelam war I and II just to rescue camps.
At that time we did not have plans to deploy troops to hold on to these camps. While we were conducting operations in the North the Army vacated all the camps in the East. When I was the Brigade Commander, Welikanda, I remember how we vacated Mavil Aru, Vakarai and
Kadiraweli in 1993 and in 1994 because we were attacked from the Punani - Valaichchenai road.
Today, we have an overall plan and this plan did not come up from nowhere. We worked very hard, trained troops, then created over 40 new
battalions, and then we have deployed over 8,000 additional troops in the East. And we have a reserve about 12,000 in the North, where we had only 1500 earlier.
In Wanni, Mannar and Weli Oya, over 13,000 troops are going on the offensive operations. We have filled almost all the vacancies. The Sri Lanka Army which had a force strength of 118,000 has now gone upto 162,000. We have put lots of efforts on training and the expansion of the Army. Although we are fighting in Mannar, Weli Oya and Vavuniya we are
also planning ahead to capture Kilinochchi or Mullaithivu. The top officials of the Army do not sit in well secured offices and give them orders.
Guidelines are very clear and don't give impossible tasks, so the soldiers are going ahead with lots of confidence.
Q: The Chief Opposition Whip, Joseph Michael Perera has accused you of having a special squad to attack media personnel who are critics of the military. Is there any truth in what he says"?
A: I have a large force operating with a strength of 162, 000 who have been trained to kill and not to assault. He who says all these things must furnish all the details to the police if he has all the information. I think he has lots of sympathy for me. No point in him talking inside the
Parliament, where nobody is going to take any action. As far as what he has mentioned all what I can say is that these are baseless allegations.
Q: But it is reported that the Army is behind the attack on Keith Noyair of The Nation newspaper who had written a military story criticizing
the military few weeks before the attack. What do you have to say about this allegation?
A: How many other journalists write political or military columns? Why should the Army attack only on Keith Noyair. I have never seen anywhere that Keith Noyair had said that the Army had attacked him. Some people are trying to put us against him. He has never accused that
the Army had assaulted him. And I think perhaps he is guilty that he has done something wrong by writing against the military.
Q: Is he tight-lipped because he is supposed to be in fear of reprisals?
A: If he has not done anything wrong, he does not have to live in fear. If he has done some damage to our organisation or to a person, especially when he has done something which he is not suppose to do, then it is natural he must be living in fear. If they think that they have
done something of that nature the best thing for them is to correct themselves and rectify the mistake.
Q: What is the role you expect the media to play during the time of war?
A: War or no war, the media should write in the interest of the country and not to please their favourites. The media is supposed to play a
neutral role to educate people. They are not supposed to create situations where they groom people and make heroes out of them. I do not
think that certain media in this country is doing their duty with a sense of responsibility.
We know that they are being bribed, given 'drinks', treated in restaurants and they have their own vested interests. And is it ethical them to go
for agendas misleading people?.
These so called media guys are not responsible to the people and they are not entitled to such media freedom. Media freedom is there for you
to do the right thing and to be fair by everybody. Nobody has given freedom for anybody to drive their own agendas. We know very well
about those media people who take bribes, write and voice their opinion for some personal gains.
That Keith Noyair who was assaulted was returning from a restaurant with his friends and they were drunk. We do not know that somebody
in the restaurant had got annoyed with them, followed him and assaulted.
So, especially the media people should behave well and set an example to others. To me, those who stage protests with unshaven beards, long
hairs and wearing costumes like in fancy dress competitions are not scribes who are clamouring for media freedom but a gang of thugs.
Q: Journalists too have the right to stage protests demanding media freedom, justice and their appearance seems to immaterial. Can you deny
that right?
A: They can stage their protests in a decent way. I do not mind learning from them if they can behave properly. Behaving like thugs! Is that
what you call media freedom? They can talk if some thing goes wrong in the interest of people and the country. They can point it out. I am
ready to learn from those who have a sense of responsibility towards national interest.
Q: Some media organisations claim that the military wants to cover up reality in the name of war. What is your comment?
A: I hope I have explained the reality of some of the media people in this country. Those who are criticising on the progress that the Army has
made, by confining to their editorials can come with us to have a look at most of the bunkers.
It is a shame that some of these journalists who criticize the military have never gone beyond Madawachchiya. When the offensives were going
on in the East they had never stepped beyond Manampitiya.
This is how they write their criticisms claiming the military assault and the media to cover up the reality. So, we can arrange these media
personnel to listen to terrorist transmissions. But they have to write what exactly that they listen to.
Meanwhile, I want warn these media guys to beware of those disgruntled high ranking military officials. They are the ones who are leaking out
misleading information to the media. We know about them and have sidelined them now.
Q: There is a claim that certain top military officials are frustrated as they are not getting their due promotions. What are the steps taken to
rectify the situation?
A: Yes, they are frustrated because we are now not looking after them. I want the Army to look after the welfare of the country. Our army
officers can not walk around like US or British Army officers.
These people are frustrated because I am not going out of my way to look after their welfare at the expenses of the Army welfare. If I put a
weak man to command a division and thereby sacrifice hundreds of soldiers like what happened in Mullaithivu, Elephant Pass and Killinochchi.
Then I will be really looking after them. Those who ran away leaving their command posts in Mullaithivu, kilinochchi and Elephant Pass are
senior Generals in the Army now. Their welfare have been perfectly looked after that time. But who looked after the welfare of those who
died and went missing? Do they want me to do the same? No, I will never do that.
Those who can't produce results will not be looked after and the only way that I can help them is by helping them to get a job outside.
Because, there are lots of jobs for retiring Generals and Brigadiers.
There are others in the Army who deal with anti-war NGOs and the media to insult the Army. These are the people who leak information and
pass the wrong information to create unfortunate situations.
So the media should be careful about these disgruntled top military officials. I am not occupying this seat merely to look after those failured
officers.
Q: President Mahinda Rajapaksa has reiterated the willingness to resume talks with the LTTE, if they lay down their arms. Do you think that
holding peace talks is necessary when the LTTE is getting cornered?
A: Yes, only if they lay down arms and come for peace talks after totally stopping terror activities. In such an environment, the President's
willingness to negotiate with the LTTE is absolutely a correct decision.
Q: If the LTTE accept the condition to commence peace talks will the military be confined to the barracks?
A: That will never happen. They can continue with the Talks but we will clear the North. The President had never said that forward march of
the Army to liberate the North will have to stop. Our troops will carry on.
Q: We can achieve military victories against LTTE terrorism. But do you agree that the national problem can be solved only through political
means?
A: Yes, I think the whole country needs some political changes to solve certain problems. So these political solutions have to come not only
for Tamils but for all the communities.
Some Tamil political, especially the couple of TNA MPs who say some thing here and utter differently when in the LTTE controlled areas may
have some serious political problems which no one can address as their aspirations are totally different.
In those war torn areas the people are facing tremendous hardships.
The damage due to war is huge and they do not have better infrastructure like roads and bridges like in other areas. People are uneducated
and children are suffering from malnutrition.
These problems cannot be solved by making R. Sampanthan or somebody else the Prime Minister of the so-called Eelam. These people need
solution for these problems.
Courtesy : Sunday Observer
Note no. 458 21-July-2008
Sri Lanka: War after the fall of Vidattalthivu– Part 1 - Update No. 146
By Col R Hariharan (Retd.)
Keeping up the momentum of their offensive, Sri Lanka army's 58 Division and Commando troops advanced another 10 km to the north to
capture Illuppakkadavai on Sunday July 20, 2008 close on the heels of their success in capturing the Sea Tiger base of Vidattalthivu on the
Mannar coast on July 16, 2008. According to Defence sources, the Commandos pursued and attacked the cadres of the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fleeing Iluppakkadavai, three km to the north on the A32 Mannar- Pooneryn road. The rapid progress of the Mannar offensive and its quick successes send clear signals of the intention of Sri Lanka President Mahinda
Rajapaksa to fight the LTTE unto finish despite his recent statement in India about his readiness to talk to the LTTE. At best the statement was
a palliative to mollify ruffled sentiments in India where the LTTE enjoys a love-hate relationship in Tamil Nadu. (And the scale still appears to
be weighted against 'love'.)
The military victories should enable the President, who had been beleaguered by issues of high inflation, food shortages and financial tight
squeeze due to war expenditure, to more confidently host the forthcoming summit of South Asian nations at the 15th SAARC meet in
Colombo. The demonstrated military strength of a leader always sends a stronger message than words. In his case it would show his
determination to pursue military objective first, regardless of the subterranean rumblings about it among the international community.
The capture of Vidattalthivu and Iluppakadavai are hard earned victories that have come about not a day soon. Though Adampan was
captured on May 8 after prolonged efforts to penetrate its satellite defences, obviously it was the breakthrough at Periyamadhu on theeastern side that had enabled the security forces to speed up their offensive. The fact the offensive troops have kept up their momentum to
secure Iluppakadavain, a well established LTTE location, in four days shows that the army is overcoming its past weakness of slowing down
after every success.
Apparently the operational plans now had been reworked and better orchestrated than the half-hearted efforts that got bogged down for quitesometime around the Giant's Tank on the flank of Adampan last year.
Though 200 cadres of the LTTE managed to pull out of the Vidattalthivu base before the security forces took it over, the operation was a
difficult one as it involved reducing well fortified defences built around the base with a network of defensive positions on three sides providing
depth to it. This was the reason why its capture took so long as it involved reducing the satellite defensive positions on the south and east. No
doubt the injection of additional troops of the newly raised 61 Division and the linking up of 57 and 58 Divisions had boosted the chances of
success in the Vidattalthivu-Iluppakadavai offensive.
With these successes, not only the LTTE's clandestine logistic umbilical chord from Tamil Nadu coast is cut, but the manoeuvring space of the
LTTE to switch troops from east to west and ability to coordinate operations on more than one front are also reduced. As against this, the
security forces have now gained a decisive advantage with the linking up of forces operating on a wide front from the key road junction at
Iluppakadavi to areas west of Mankulam on the A9 highway.
After the fall of Iluppakkadavai, the Nachchikuda LTTE base located 17 km further to the north becomes an important objective in the
security forces offensive towards Pooneryn. Sea Tiger operations from Nachchikuda in tandem with Vidattalthivu had been a thorn in the flesh
of Sri Lanka navy. The shallow waters of Vidattalthivu and the hundreds of Indian fishing boats in the vicinity had enabled the Sea Tiger boats
to carry out sneak operations with little interference.
As the Sea Tigers would be handicapped after the fall of Vidattalthivu, the navy should be able to control if not totally curtail sea movement
across Palk Bay and Nachikuda either towards island territories off Jaffna or to the Tamil Nadu coast. It would also help the navy in providing
better support to its outposts and detachments operating along the coast from the Mannar salient to Delft island.
The land offensive building up against Nachchikuda might well turn out to be a combined army-navy operation. The offensive patrolling
operations of coastal patrol vessels of the navy reported in the seas around Vidattalthivu and Nachchikuda on July 20 indicate the likelihood of
greater naval involvement in operations against Nachchikuda and more importantly in Pooneryn later. However, before Nachchikuda is taken the security forces will have to secure and consolidate their hold on line Vellankulam-Tunukkai-Malavi
on the road branching off from A32 to Mankulam. (This would probably involve further advance on a broad front for about 4km.) In the
present operational situation, the Mankulam-Vellankulam axis to the east of A32 provides perhaps the best opportunity for the LTTE to
launch a counterattack to dislodge the security forces as they are stretched now with the rapid advance. So we can expect the 57 Division
sector to the west of A9 road become active in the coming week.
The A32 provides an alternate route to Jaffna from Pooneryn across the Jaffna Bay. Pooneryn's location on the western flank of A9 road can
bring the war closer to Kilinochchi. Even if Pooneryn is not captured, the successes of the security forces on A32 road have increased their
options to further progress their offensive because they will be operating on a wide front with a choice of multiple thrust lines with the
advantage of secure flanks.
In spite of the quick successes, Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka, the Army Commander is understandably cautious about the course of operations in
the future. This is evident from the interview he had given to the Sunday Observer on July 20. His guarded approach had enabled him to
carefully plan and conduct his operations probably at a time of his choosing. So he usually avoids coming up with rash promises on operations
unlike some politicians. Perhaps he remembers that nearly a decade ago when the LTTE was not having so of much fire power, it had
upstaged the Sri Lanka security forces in the same sector though they had scored initial successes. It is interesting to see despite the official
claims of killing 9000 LTTE cadres in Eelam War-4 he still credits the LTTE with a strength of 5000, which appears to be a realistic
assessment. This strength includes hardened elements as well as raw inexperienced and ill trained hands. How they fare against the armed
forces will be seen in the coming weeks.
["Sri Lanka: War after the fall of Vidattalthivu– Part 2" to follow will include the LTTE's options and Indian reaction to the ongoing war.]
(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force
in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies.
LTTE is like a dog with rabies that needs to be destroyed
says Brig. Kamal Gunaratne
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"The answer is simple. An ambulance can usually carry around 2 patients. Lets say if you have fifty wounded from these battles, they will be airlifted to Colombo since they are no land routs. They would need around 25 ambulances. 25 ambulances with sirens can will drag a lot of
attention of the public. But in war, the reality is that you will get causalities."
________________
by Udara Soysa and Nilantha Illangamuwa, Mirusuvil - Jaffna
(July 20, Mirusuvil, Sri Lanka Guardian) He is an unusual man. A man who is of one of a kind that one would get to meet in a lifetime. A giant
of a man with dominating posture and an eloquent orator with a witty and jovial nature, he is able to dominate an interested and bored
nonchalant audience alike. Following is the interview with Brig. Kamal Gunaratne, General Office of Commanding – 55 Division (Reserve
Strike Force) [Image: Brig. Kamal Gunaratne talks to the Sri Lanka Guardian at his office in Mirusuvil)
Sri Lanka Guardian:- What do you think is the success behind the recent military victories of Sri Lanka Army?
Brig. Kamal Gunaratne:- It is clearly the brilliant leadership given from the top. The proper leadership is evident among both junior and senior
officers of the Army. This in turn had boosted confidence of both officers and soldiers at ground. They are highly motivated.
Sri Lanka Guardian:- What needs to be done with the LTTE?
Brig. Kamal Gunaratne:- LTTE is like a dog infected with rabies that needs to be destroyed. There is no other way to deal with a dog with
rabies than killing it. This is the same theory with LTTE. Our army will achieve this task. I am very confident about our troops. LTTE does not
have a strong leadership. Their best fighter Karuna too had left them. However when it comes to Army, we are having one of the most able
men leading troops from the front.
Sri Lanka Guardian:- Is it true that the new equipments that government had given the Army are also keys for the success?
Brig. Kamal Gunaratne:- Well, we indeed have clear fire superiority over the enemy. However, when it comes to the war, it comes at the end
to the dog fight between men in front. Our troops are advanced trained and possessing a higher morale over the enemy. This is the key to the
success.
Sri Lanka Guardian:- Was Muhamalai battle a debacle?
Brig. Kamal Gunaratne:- Certainly not. We have achieved our objectives. If you look at the narrow bottle neck of 8 km line in the Killali
Nargar Kovil axis, you will clearly see that we fought in a highly immobile terrain with lack of space for troops movements. In this backlight,
there will be casualties. But LTTE causalities are clearly outnumbering our causalities plus we have gained clear strategic advancements over
the enemy through these battles. However, the media reporting on these particular battles had been sad. The reality of these battles, practical
issues had not been clearly reported by the media. It is also interesting to note the fact that majority of wounded on these battles are P3
casualties and they had reported again to active duty within a week.
Sri Lanka Guardian:- However, we did see many ambulances coming from Rathmalana to hospitals after these battles. How do you explain
this?
Brig. Kamal Gunaratne:- The answer is simple. An ambulance can usually carry around 2 patients. Lets say if you have fifty wounded from
these battles, they will be airlifted to Colombo since they are no land routs. They would need around 25 ambulances. 25 ambulances with
sirens can will drag a lot of attention of the public. But in war, the reality is that you will get causalities.
Sri Lanka Guardian:- Who are manning the LTTE FLD's?
Brig. Kamal Gunaratne:- Most the LTTE lines are manned by hardcore LTTE cadres. This is a very important point for the LTTE. Our men
are highly trained and will standup to any hardcore LTTE cadre in the ground.
Sri Lanka Guardian:- Are you ready if LTTE try to take over Jaffna?
Brig. Kamal Gunaratne:- I pray that LTTE would make an effort to attack our defenses. It will be the killing fields for these hapless LTTE
cadres. We have a strategy and we know we will succeed.- Sri Lanka Guardian --------------------Thousands flee SLA artillery barrage[TamilNet, Tuesday, 22 July 2008, 04:20 GMT]Thousands of civilians from Moon’raampiddi, Paaliyaa’ru, Ka’neasapuram, and Theavanpiddi areas are moving out of their villages due to
continued artillery attack by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) on their settlements, seeking temporary refuge in Vannearikkulam and Akkaraayan
areas in Ki'linochchi district, sources in Vanni said.
The schools and public buildings are overflowing with people seeking shelter.
Those unable to find accommodation are gathered under trees and along the streets in large numbers.--------------------------- Sri Lanka rebels announce ceasefire The military has claimed several successes in its campaign against the Tigers [AFP] Sri Lanka's Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have announced they will observe a unilateral ceasefire for about one week in an effort
to support the South Asian regional summit.
The announcement by the Tamil Tigers of a temporary ceasefire came in an emailed statement on Monday.
There was no immediate response from the Sri Lankan government.
"As a sign of this goodwill, our movement is glad to inform that it will observe a unilateral ceasefire that is devoid of military actions during the
period of the SAARC conference from July 26 to August 4, and give our co-operation for the success of the conference," the statement said.
The Tigers said they would take defensive action if the Sri Lankan military disrespected their gesture and carried out any offensives against
them.
The Sri Lankan government claims its campaign against the Tigers is going well and on Sunday announced that it had killed over 5,000 Tamil
Tiger fighters already this year.
"The government would probably take a rater dim view that the LTTE is declaring a ceasefire when they are apparently suffering such heavy
casualties," Minelle Fernandez, reporting for Al Jazeera from Colombo, Sri Lanka's capital, said.
Earlier on Monday, Sri Lanka's military announced it had destroyed 13 Tamil Tiger boats off the island's west coast as it continued its push
against the Tigers' northern strongholds.
The LTTE said nine civilians, including three children, were wounded in an attack by the Sri Lankan navy and air force on fishing boats in the
coastal village of Anpupuram in Kilinochchi district. Source:New York Times 22-07-08---------Govt. rejects LTTE ceasefire offer Uditha KUMARASINGHE, Irangika RANGE and Sandasen MARASINGHE
KOTTE: Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama told Parliament yesterday that the Government would not enter into any agreement with the
LTTE although they have declared a unilateral ceasefire during the period of the SAARC summit.
The Minister said the Government will continue with the measures taken against the LTTE so far.
Minister Bogollagama also asserted that the Government would never discuss in this regard with the LTTE and would not accept the truce
agreements declared by the LTTE.
The Minister made this observation after National Freedom Front leader Wimal Weerawansa queried whether the Government would accept
the LTTE’s unilateral ceasefire. He said it was reported that the LTTE was proposing to the Government a ceasefire through Norwegian
mediators during the SAARC summit.
============India comes out with strong possible terms By Satheesan Kumaaran July 21, 2008 India has come out with its strongest possible terms in dealing with the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. India can no longer afford to remain a
spectator as it has been since the death of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. This most recent development is not entirely unexpected where Sri Lanka's
internal conflict is right in India's backyard impacting India on several fronts.
India has had on-and-off relations with Sri Lanka since India gained independence from Britain in 1947. They were not necessarily all good. In
the late 70s and early 80s, India wanted to keep Sri Lanka in check by making it deal with its own problems, so India created the issue of
Plantation Tamils vis-à-vis the native Sri Lankan Tamils. Around this time, India also helped train Tamil militants to fight the Sri Lankan
government forces, despite vehement condemnation from Sri Lanka, at the time when the Tamils were discriminated against in many levels and
spheres...
After the death of Indira Gandhi in 1984 her son, pilot-turned-politician, Rajiv Gandhi, mishandled the Sri Lankan Tamil issue. Senior advisors
advised Gandhi that befriending Sri Lanka would be in India's best interest. India would be in a better position to keep Sri Lanka-based
strategic locations, like Trincomalee, for itself, preventing Sri Lanka from allowing other world powers a strong hold in the region. But, India
realized it was not in a position to intervene directly in these issues. India got the opportunity in 1987 when the Sri Lankan armed forces were
at the mercy of the LTTE in the northeast. UNP leader, J. R. Jayawardene, asked Rajiv Gandhi in 1987 to send armed forces to fight the
LTTE and agreed in writing that the troops would only help keep peace on the island. As part of the written agreement, Sri Lanka consented
never to allow foreign countries access to its ports without India's consent. Gandhi came to Sri Lanka and signed the accord on July 29, 1987
- the Indo-Lanka agreement.
On July 30, 1987, Rajiv Gandhi was assaulted by a Sinhalese naval cadet named Vijayamunige Rohana de Silva, while receiving the guard of
honour, but escaped unharmed. A political and diplomatic calamity was avoided, but, if it weren't for this agreement the ethnic conflict on the
island would have been resolved a long time ago. Things between India and Sri Lankan Tamils completely changed after Gandhi was killed on
May 21, 1991, while electioneering in Sriperumputhur near Chennai, allegedly by the LTTE. India since then has maintained a hands-off policy
towards the Sri Lankan internal conflict.
When the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by Manmohan Singh came to power in 2004, it began to recognize the grievances of Sri
Lankan Tamils under pressure from southern Indian politicians. South Indian politicians changed their attitudes over the Eelam Tamils'
grievances following clashes that erupted between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. The support towards Eelam Tamils at the
grassroots level in south India began to increase after LTTE launched several successful attacks against Sri Lankan armed forces. On
Rajapaksa coming to power in 2005 he increased the violence against Tamils in the northeast and created a sense of sympathy in India for the
Eelam Tamils. India, however, played a key role, though indirectly, in bringing the LTTE and the GoSL to the negotiating table.
Tamil circles also speculated that the LTTE had halted all its military operations against the Sri Lankan armed forces at the urging of India and
other foreign governments to give them a chance to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Although the LTTE has been beaten severely by
the Sri Lankan army and has lost some leading political and military cadres, the LTTE has maintained its silence.
It is in this context that India's Foreign Secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon, National Security Advisor, M.K. Narayanan, and Defence Secretary,
Vijay Singh arrived in Colombo on June 20 for a secret, two-day visit.
India's words of wisdom to the GoSL On June 18, Indian High Commissioner, Alok Prasad, informed Sri Lanka's Presidential Secretariat that a high-level Indian delegation would
arrive within 48 hours and would want to consult with them. Their priority was a meeting with President Mahinda Rajapaksa. They also sought
a meeting with Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, Senior Presidential Advisor Basil Rajapaksa, and Presidential Secretary Lalith
Weeratunga. The visit was to remain confidential with no publicity given to it. The JVP and several government ministers were opposed to
India's intervention in Sri Lanka's internal matters. They also feared that India would face criticism from some Indian politicians for sending the
three-man delegation to Sri Lanka, as these men, especially Narayanan, had held anti-LTTE views since the early 1980s. Even Sri Lanka's
Foreign Affairs Ministry was not informed until the delegation arrived at the Katunayake airport on June 20 at about 11:40 a.m.
Upon their arrival in Colombo they held a meeting with Sri Lanka's Defence Secretary, Gothabaya Rajapaksa, and then Arumugam
Thondaman of the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC). The next day they met with the EPDP leader, Douglas Devananda, and finally
President Rajapaksa.
The delegation put forward some proposals that Rajapaksa apparently refused. The Indian delegation gave him two options: One, to allow the
SAARC summit to be held from July 27 to August 3 in Colombo as proposed, and, two, should the president not accept, India would have
no choice but to not lend its support to the SAARC summit in Colombo. They told the president of intelligence they had received that the
LTTE would launch attacks in Colombo during or prior to the SAARC summit in Colombo. The president then had no choice but to accept
the Indian delegation's demands.
What are these demands? The demands are: (1) A peace package to bring an end to the Tamil national question. The delegation was not satisfied when the President told them that he
would bring a peaceful settlement to the conflict once the LTTE is wiped out of the North, which he estimated would take seven to eight
months. The Indian delegation responded with an intelligence report that stated that the GoSL could not win against the LTTE militarily and the
time frame Rajapaksa proposed was too long. They also told him that the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) was moving far too
slowly.
The visiting delegation referenced the statement issued by their Government soon after the interim report of the APRC was released in January
of this year. India declared those proposals as a "welcome first step" and urged the Government to move ahead with forward thinking
proposals. They also sought Government views on the much touted "southern consensus" amidst fears that priority may be shifting to "divisive
politics."
Talks also revolved around the non-implementation of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution and not allowing the Thamil Makkal Viduthalai
Pulikal (TMVP) into the APRC unless disarmed.
(2) Economic issues. The Indian delegation wanted to make sure Indian companies were not made scapegoats of a crisis in energy or food
supply. They feared this would force a different turn on bilateral relations. There had also been discrete exchange of views on the economic
involvements of China, Iran and Malaysia.
(3) Defence procurements. They expressed their dissatisfaction over GoSL continuing to buy arms from Pakistan and China. Rajapaksa told
the delegation that they would not need to go to other countries for weapons if India provided them. The Indian delegation responded by
saying that India would come to Sri Lanka's aid only in the area of self-defence, but would not supply weapons to fight the Tamil minority on
the island.
(4) Security situation. The delegation examined whether the intensifying military campaign against the LTTE resulted in retaliatory strikes and
security lapses. They also expressed serious concern over the flow of Sri Lankan refugees into India, and the hardships caused to the Tamil
community in Sri Lanka including those in the plantation sector due to stringent security operations throughout the country.
(5) SAARC summit in Colombo. The delegation reported attacks and/or discovery of weapons, bombs or improvised explosive devices in
every potential SAARC venue, and several explosions have happened in and around Colombo after it was identified as the next venue. The
Indian delegation urged the Government to provide the proper environment and security for the SAARC summit. India was particularly
concerned about safety for their delegation, as well as for those from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nepal, and that an Indian connection would
certainly be concocted in the event any unfortunate incidents occurred. If this situation remained unresolved, the delegation maintained, India
might not attend the SAARC summit. Improved security could happen only by an improvement in the ground situation.
The delegation also highlighted several factors: (a) The ongoing military campaign in the north and resultant threats elsewhere; (b) the security
situation in the south; (c) the absence of a "southern consensus" through the APRC; (d) feared accusations against India over political and
economic issues and whether the trend would intensify; and (e) unhealthy relations with the International Community over human rights and a
growing list of other issues.
India to send military aid to Sri Lanka again Since Rajapaksa agreed to all the demands of the Indian delegation India is now taking care of the matter of security in Sri Lanka's south,
patrolling the air, land and sea. India will be sending helicopters to Colombo to monitor the security situation and to prevent LTTE attacks in
Colombo during and prior to the SAARC summit. The Indian navy will also patrol the seas around Colombo city with fast attack craft during
the summit.
India also said it wanted a political solution to the Tamil national question from the GoSL because New Delhi no longer wanted a prolonged
ethnic conflict. India is expecting a political solution within the next three months and Rajapaksa has promised to do so. India continues to urge
Colombo to see the GoSL peace proposals to end the ethnic conflict. Otherwise, India would have no choice but to not attend the SAARC
summit in Colombo.
However, opponents of having Indian armed men in Colombo argue that this is a litmus test for India to gauge the extent of its future
involvements, either directly or indirectly, in dealing with Sri Lanka's problems. They also argue that India is trying to show the world that India
is a 'big brother' in south Asia and no other global power can intervene in Sri Lanka when the country comes under attack by LTTE military
operations.
In the early 2000s, the GoSL had sought foreign intervention to secure the liberation of the Sri Lankan armed forces trapped in Jaffna
peninsula when the LTTE overthrew SLA camps and pushed into the SLA-controlled Jaffna peninsula after blocking the air, land and sea
routes. When the Sri Lankan armed forces faced death with their supply routes cut off, India intervened immediately to prevent any other
foreign armed forces from getting involved.
The LTTE demanded that if India or any other country came to help the Sri Lankan armed forces that they should not leave them anywhere in
the Tamil homeland, including the port city of Trincomalee. More specifically, India should escort them to its shores before escorting them to
the Sinhala (homeland) areas. The GoSL did not agree to these conditions. In return, India proposed that the LTTE and GoSL engage in
peace talks, to allow the Sri Lankan armed forces to remain in Jaffna safely. However, no agreement came out of the peace talks. In the event
that the LTTE did launch military operations against the soldiers in Jaffna a third force would be sent in to help the Sri Lankan soldiers.
So long as the LTTE remains on India's terrorist list, they cannot deal with the LTTE legally. India needs to lift the ban on the LTTE before it
can hold face-to-face meetings with the LTTE and it is doubtful whether India will do this soon, since India will be holding its elections next
year and politicians do not want to make the issue of lifting the ban on the LTTE an election issue.
India invites TNA to New Delhi Before leaving, the Indian delegation met with TNA leader, R. Sampanthan. The TNA is said to be the proxy of the LTTE in the parliament.
At the conclusion of the discussion, the Indian delegation invited Sampanthan to visit New Delhi for further discussions. Sampanthan
mentioned the growing influence of Pakistan and China on military affairs in Sri Lanka. The TNA expressed its satisfaction saying that it was
happy to accept the invitation to New Delhi. The TNA have the support of the people in the North and East and the LTTE. Hopefully, the
TNA can certainly help bridge the gap between India and the LTTE. The TNA had sought appointments with Indian leaders on several
occasions, but did not succeed. Sampanthan's most recent interview with the media on his interaction with the Indian delegation is of particular
significance and gives an insight into the thinking of the Tamil speaking people and the LTTE.
In the meantime, in a letter to the Indian Prime Minister, General Secretary of the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK),
Vaiko, has accused India of "equipping the GoSL to help its war machine to continue to perpetrate its genocidal attacks against the Tamils...
throwing to winds the farsighted foreign policy adopted by Pundit Nehru and Mrs. Indira Gandhi," and urged the Prime Minister to not
participate in the SAARC summit. He said further in the letter that: "I accuse that the Government of India gave a red carpet welcome to the
Sri Lanka President and the Ministers whose hands are stained with the blood of Tamils...I accuse that the Government of India has
sanctioned a loan of 100 million dollars at 2% interest to the Defence Ministry of Sri Lanka enabling them to purchase weapons from Pakistan
and China, which would be used to decimate the Tamil race."
He wrote further: "I accuse that the Government of India, burying fathoms deep all the norms of humanism, prevented the supply of food and
medicines to the suffering Tamils in that island by not giving permission to the International Red Cross to send the materials collected in Tamil
Nadu...I am pained to make the accusation that the Indian Government, particularly the abovementioned officials are assisting the Sri Lanka
Government, which is making all out military offensive to liquidate the Tamil race, throwing to winds the farsighted foreign policy adopted by
Pundit Nehru and Mrs. Indira Gandhi."
India has been the home to the Tamil militancy, to nearly 75 million Tamils, and to those with family ties to Tamils living in Sri Lanka under
disparaging circumstances. The Indian Government has a vested interest in getting involved in bringing an end to Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict.
India has never favoured the Tamils nor is India in favour of the Sinhalese. The Sinhalese have always viewed India with suspicion. However,
due to political pressure from south India, India will have no choice but to support the Tamils to maintain their power base in the Tamil Eelam.
Positive involvement of India is dependant on the support of Indian Tamils, giving Indian Tamils a golden opportunity to encourage India to
help bring a positive end to Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. The war between the LTTE and the GoSL will undoubtedly bring destruction and
misery, and as a big brother in the region, India has the moral obligation to directly intervene to end the three-decade-long Tamil/Sinhala
conflict. The question is whether it is in her interest to do so.
Courtesy: The Tamil Mirror (July Issue) (The author can be reached at: satheessan_kumaaran@yahoo.com) --------------------Eelam war and the external battlefield–Dayan JayatillekaSri Lanka’s main strength is on the internal front, its main vulnerability is external. The
LTTE’s main weakness is on the internal front, its main strength is increasingly on the external front. This is evident when one contrasts the
progress of the Sri Lankan armed forces with the success of the Pongu Thamil demonstrations in the West. Paradoxically, the democratic Sri
Lankan state is doing better than the terrorist militarist Tigers in the domain of "hard power", while the militarist Tigers are doing well in that of
"soft power".
As they do badly on the military front, the latent strength of the LTTE is increasingly becoming manifest and is being thrown on to the scales in
a desperate gamble. That is the soft power of the dominant pro-secessionist stream of the Tamil Diaspora, the LTTE’s global rearguard and
reserve.
In general, the internal factor is more important than the external. As the Sikh and Chechen insurgencies were defeated on the ground – by
military and political means – the strong support for them among Diaspora communities in the West proved irrelevant and withered. However,
every rule has its exceptions, and in 1987 Sri Lanka, a vulnerable island, experienced the importance of the external over the internal. That
balance was righted in 1990, but Prabhakaran had lived to fight another decade.
While Tamil Nadu is a demographic and geopolitical given, the Tamil Diaspora is of course a Sinhala extremist creation. It is the direct product
of the anti-Tamil riots of 1958 and 1983. If not for those attacks, the Tamil middle and upper middle classes would not have wished to migrate
and the doors of the West would not have been opened for them. The success of the anti-Lankan lobbying by the Tamil Diaspora resides in
the social character and insertion of that Diaspora. It is not that the Sri Lankan Sinhala Diaspora has no sophisticated strata drawn from the
professional elite. It is that this component is either alienated by national dynamics or the dynamics within the Sinhala Diaspora, and is thus de
-motivated or de-mobilized, while their Tamil counterparts are motivated by the bitter experiences that drove them from their original
homeland.
The loss of the Sea Tiger base at Vidathalthivu to Brigadier Shavi de Silva’s men, is a strategic blow to the LTTE, and gives credence to the
claim that we are now entering the end phase of the conventional war between the Sri Lankan state and the separatist terrorist army. To
borrow the celebrated phraseology of Winston Churchill, we are not at the end of the end, but nor are we at the end of the beginning. We are
at the beginning of the end. The markers of victory of this stage of the war would be the disintegration of the main-force units of the LTTE, the
reunification of the country’s territory, and as in the case of the defeat of the JVP insurgency, the elimination of the historic leadership of the
Tigers.
Prabhakaran’s strategy at this stage is predictable. He would hope to draw the SLA into a meat-grinder on his home turf, while seeking out
the gaps in the disposition of our forces so as to launch one or more counterattacks, thereby reversing the tides of war. That would be his best
case scenario, while his fallback option would be to break up into small units, abandon territory and revert to classic guerrilla warfare.
The war would then revert to a low intensity conflict. Colombia’s war is regarded in the international media to have gone on for forty years, ten
more than the Sri Lankan, but students of the conflict know that Manuel Marulanda, the founder leader of FARC, who died recently of natural
causes, took up arms even before the Cuban revolution. Similarly, the twin insurgencies in the Philippines, those of the CPP-NPA and the
Moros of Mindanao have been ongoing for four and three decades respectively. The lesson is that some insurgencies are more durable and
intractable than others. Yet, they are manageable.
The experienced, well trained and motivated Sri Lankan military brass will obviously anticipate Prabhakaran’s thinking and already seems to
have done so. The danger zone lies beyond what one can expect of the military. That is in anticipating and countering the non-military, yet
utterly strategic, aspects of Prabhakaran’s thinking and planning.
Any human being naturally tends to repeat what has proven successful for him, and when under pressure Prabhakaran has historically been
successful in three non-military moves: (i) provoking Sinhalese extremists into attacks on Tamil civilians (ii) lobbying Tamil Nadu to widen the
gap between Delhi and Colombo and (iii) escaping through the gap between the two democracies, Sri Lanka and India.
For some time, he has not been successful in repeating the first success, i.e. racist attacks on Tamil civilians, but that does not mean he will not
try his utmost, and this the State must be vigilant against, ready to crack down at the slightest sign, from whichever quarter that sign emanates.
He may be obtaining more success in manipulating Tamil Nadu opinion and therefore Indian politics. An editorial of the pro-Tiger Sudar Oli
clearly reveals the LTTE leadership’s hope that elections in the world’s most powerful and most populous democracies, the USA and India,
will open up space for the Tigers which they hope to manipulate and maneuver in.
Prabhakaran thus hopes to hold on militarily in his home base – or at worst, retreat into the jungle and wage protracted guerrilla warfare --
until the external situation changes in what he hopes will be his favor or at least against the Sri Lankan side. He is counting on the external
outweighing the internal and "soft power" factors such as public opinion compensating for the erosion of "hard power".
Vadamaarachchi
Vadamaarachchi
He has escaped military defeat not once but twice, using this factor. The first time was in Vadamaarachchi in 1987, and the second was a year
later in late 1988, when he used the gap between Delhi and Colombo over the tardiness of devolution (the latter was battling an anti-
devolution insurgency) and the incentive of the Tamil Nadu vote with an election imminent, to prevent the IPKF Para Commandos from going
in for the kill once they had encircled his base complex.
What is puzzling is why we – by which I mean some Sinhalese elements who profess to be anti-LTTE -- are behaving in such a manner as to
assist Prabhakaran to escape the trap that he is in.
While the Sri Lankan state, government, leadership (President Rajapakse) and ruling party (the SLFP), are clearly conscious unlike the UNP
government of the 1980s, of the imperative for excellent relations with India, the same ideological and social forces who waged an anti-Indian,
anti-devolution struggle in the ’80s and thereby provided Prabhakaran with an opportunity of escaping firstly the Sri Lankan and then the
Indian armed forces, are active today, albeit split into three formations.
Some criticize the presence of Indian security units at the SAARC summit, forgetting that their presence reduces the risk and enhances the cost
of an LTTE hit, and that if they were not present, the Sri Lankan armed forces would have to be diverted for the task.
Others oppose Indo-Lanka economic ties, oblivious to the advantage gained by links with one of the world’s fastest growing economies, and
the strategic benefits of giving India an economic incentive or stake in Sri Lanka, to offset even slightly, the anti-Lanka weight of the Tamil
Nadu factor.
Still others scratch at the scab of old wounds, such as Indian training of Tamil militants, again forgetting that it was at least in part a self-inflicted
wound, insofar as July ’83 provided the cause or catalyst for that policy.
Some hallucinate that China or Pakistan can be played off against India, unaware of Pakistan’s current preoccupations and China and India’s
rapidly growing economic ties as well as their determination not to fall victim to the game of some extra-regional powers to pit one against the
other.
Voices are raised against devolution while the war is on, and oppose the full implementation of the 13th amendment, ignorant of the fact that
we can create the political space to win the war without interference or external support to the LTTE, only if we are seen, at the least, to fully
and speedily re-flate and re-float Provincial autonomy.
Then there are those who are generating religious intolerance and hostility (the most recent being an attack on a Sri Lankan Burgher pastor and
his family), oblivious to the fact that there are 18 million Evangelicals in the USA, the world’s sole superpower, constituting a well-organized
and decisive force which both US Presidential candidates are busily wooing.
It is one thing to avoid being a puppet or doormat of the West, robustly support the platform of the Non-aligned Movement, cultivate excellent
relations with Russia and China (who vetoed the resolution against Zimbabwe in the Security Council recently), reach out to emerging new
centers of power and influence, and deepen our Asian identity while strengthening especially, relations with our neighbors. It is another to lash
out in all directions on issues and against countries or cultures, where we will have no support from anyone (including in the Non-Aligned
Movement) and succeed only in isolating ourselves.
(These are the personal views of the writer)
------------------July 20, 2008Nuclear Talks With Iran End in a Deadlock By ELAINE SCIOLINOGENEVA — International talks on Iran’s nuclear ambitions ended in deadlock on Saturday, despite the Bush administration’s decision to
reverse policy and send a senior American official to the table for the first time.
The presence of William J. Burns, the under secretary of state for political affairs, was one of the most important encounters between Iran and
the United States since relations were severed nearly three decades ago. And it was part of a rare show of unity among the six negotiating
partners — the United States, France, Britain, Germany, Russia and China — who pressed Iran to accept compromise.
But Iran responded with a written document that failed to address the main issue: international demands that it stop enriching uranium. And
Iranian diplomats reiterated before the talks that they considered the issue nonnegotiable.
Specifically, the world powers wanted Iran to accept a formula known as “freeze-for-freeze” to break the deadlock. Under the formula, Iran
would not add to its nuclear program, and the United States and other powers would not seek new international sanctions for six weeks to
pave the way for formal negotiations. The proposal was originally offered to Iran last year and presented again to it last month as part of a new
proposal to ultimately give Iran economic and political incentives if it stops producing enriched uranium.
But officials involved in Saturday’s negotiations said that when they repeatedly pressed the Iranians to say whether they could accept the idea,
the question was evaded every time.
“We still didn’t get the answer we were looking for,” the European Union foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, said at a news conference after
several hours of talks, held in Geneva’s City Hall.
Mr. Solana said the Iranians were given two weeks to formally respond to the proposal before it would be withdrawn.
At the news conference, Saeed Jalili, Iran’s chief negotiator, refused to answer whether Iran would accept a freeze of its uranium enrichment
program, however temporary. But he called the negotiating process a “very beautiful endeavor” with a result that he hoped would eventually
be “beautiful to behold.”
Mr. Burns did not speak privately with Mr. Jalili. But in a brief statement in the morning meeting, he said that the United States was serious in
its support for the six-power process and serious that Iran must suspend its production of enriched uranium, the State Department said.
He told his negotiating partners after the talks that the United States would push for new punitive sanctions at the United Nations Security
Council in September, one participant in the meeting said.
Saturday’s meeting at Geneva’s City Hall was one of the most important public encounters between an Iranian and an American official since
relations were halted after the American Embassy was seized in Tehran in 1979.
Other authorized meetings have occurred. Madeleine K. Albright, as secretary of state, for example, once sat at the same table with then
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi and other emissaries at the United Nations to discuss Afghanistan. Colin L. Powell, as secretary of state,
once shook Mr. Kharrazi’s hand. American and Iranian officials have met episodically in Baghdad to discuss Iraq’s security.
But Saturday’s meeting was the highest-level session between the countries during the Bush administration, which once branded Iran part of an
“axis of evil” and has not ruled out military action against Iran because of its nuclear ambitions.
It comes as the Bush administration, in its final months, has told some of its closest allies that the United States was moving forward with a plan
to establish an American diplomatic presence in Tehran for the first time since the rupture in bilateral relations.
But for some, it is hard to understand why the Americans have made a diplomatic gesture with Mr. Burns’s participation at this time.
America’s negotiating partners, particularly Britain, had wanted an American presence when they traveled to Tehran last month to present an
enhanced package of incentives. That moment, officials said, would have been meaningful and more logical.
Instead, Mr. Burns came to the table when the Iranians were giving their reply, and there had never been a strong signal that it was going to be
different from the past.
Despite the shift in American willingness to talk, one point of policy clearly has not changed: the Bush administration wants to avoid the
impression that it is negotiating with Iran before it suspends its production of enriched uranium, which can be used to make electricity or fuel
bombs.
Even the subject of a joint photograph was one of dispute. The only photo accepted by the American side was one with all parties at the table.
The Americans objected to the idea of a photo of Mr. Solana and Mr. Jalili at a joint news conference with Mr. Burns and the other
participants standing behind them.
Complicating the diplomacy was the fact that before Saturday’s talks, the six powers were not united on a joint strategy on how to proceed.
The American delegation had told its partners that Mr. Burns’s appearance was a one-time event and that Iran had two weeks to decide
whether to accept the “freeze-for-freeze” formula.
Germany, Russia and China, by contrast, argued that there should be time to explore the negotiating track with Iran.
There were other disagreements among the six powers as well. France and Britain have argued that there should be a precise definition of
what the Iranians would have to freeze to open the way to formal talks.
But those disagreements evaporated during the talks with Iran. The six powers presented a united front in pushing the Iranians to give a clear
answer on whether they were willing to make the good-faith gesture of halting new nuclear activity to pave the way for formal talks.
-----------------The significance of the Vidattaltivu victory Gains in Weli Oya also as troops make headway further north A commission of Inquiry may probe killing of Indian fishermen Tightest ever security since NAM summit as tense Lanka prepares for SAARC By Iqbal Athas There was a great sense of elation in the security establishment, quite justifiably, over the Army's re-capture last Wednesday of the coastal
village of Vidattaltivu in the Mannar sector.
It was the location of a major Sea Tiger base. Its importance grew after Security Forces launched an offensive in this sector since July 2 last
year. After losing the coastal areas of Silavathurai (south of Mannar) in October 2007, for Tiger guerrillas Vidattaltivu became a landing point
for military and medical supplies. This was across the Gulf of Mannar from "safe houses" in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu.
The once busy One Four Base of the LTTE in the jungles north of Weli Oya. Guerrilla leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was known to have lived
here before and during the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) presence in Sri Lanka. There is also a lesser-known fact in Wednesday's Army success that adds to the elation. Whilst troops re-gained control of the areas around
the base, their colleagues continued their advance further northeastwards seizing more territory. Yesterday, troops re-captured the coastal
village of Iluppaikaddavai located further northwards. They were positioned outside the town area last night. This gives greater depth and
protection to Vidattaltivu. The troops are were now some five kilometers away from Thunnukai.
The final moments before the fall of Vidattaltivu were without any confrontation. Two soldiers, however, were injured after they stepped on
"Battas" or improvised mines. Air Force Mi-24 helicopter gunships fired at fleeing guerrillas. The original aim of the offensives in the Mannar
sector, since July last year, was to gain control of areas in and around the Madhu Church, sacred to Catholics. Mid way, a second aim to re-
capture the Sea Tiger base was included. Two columns of troops advanced northwards, one from west of the Giant's tank and another from
the east. In April, troops re-gained control of the church area. Thereafter, during their advance, the two columns merged and headed for
Vidattaltivu.
The success there, no doubt, is a credit for the Security Forces personnel who laid down their lives, were wounded and those who fought
against all odds. It has been a practice for the guerrillas, more often than not, to offer stiff resistance and back out when they come under
heavy military pressure. The aim in such circumstances is to inflict damage to troops whilst they dismantle and remove most of their
infrastructure except immovable items.
This happened when the Army launched "Operation Riviresa" (Sun Rays) in October 1985 to regain control of the Jaffna peninsula. Whist
offering resistance to troops, the LTTE moved a sizeable volume of its armoury and other assets across the Kilali lagoon to the Wanni. There
have been some exceptions, too. One was when "Operation Jaya Sikurui" (Victory Assured) was launched in May 1997 to regain control of
the land mass between Nochchimodai (Vavuniya) and Kilinochchi.
This was to link the Jaffna peninsula with Vavuniya, both sectors under Government control. The guerrillas assumed a conventional posture to
resist the troop advance. This offensive became the costliest for the military both in terms of human and material losses.
"Operation Jaya Sikurui" was called off in late 1999 on the orders of then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. Similarly, Army's
onslaught at Vidattaltivu prompted the guerrillas to shift base from there before the final assault came.. According to intelligence sources, they
had moved to Nachchikuda, where another major Sea Tiger base had functioned for many years. However, that will not make things easy for
the guerrillas. From their earlier base at Vidattaltivu, it was a straight run smuggling military and medical supplies across the Gulf of Mannar.
This was using fishing trawlers. The shallow seas there have restricted the movement of Naval craft in the Gulf of Mannar.
Fighting in the Mannar sector has prompted some civilians to flee the area for safety. Here is a scene from Mallawai where a family is moving
their belongings in a tractor. A longer course across the sea and continued naval patrols will entail more problems in using their base at Nachchikuda. Making it difficult for
the LTTE to smuggle in logistics supplies is not the only gain from the Army's success at Vidattaltivu. In extending their control of the coastline
northwards from Mannar until that village, the troops have effectively placed a barrier against the outflow of refugees to Tamil Nadu.
At present more than 120,000 Sri Lankan refugees are housed in camps and cared for by the Government of India. Almost the entirety of
them had crossed the Gulf of Mannar, some paying large sums of money to boat operators. Successive governments have also accused the
LTTE of promoting or even arranging for an exodus of refugees to Tamil Nadu to exacerbate Indian Government's concerns.
As the troops, continue their advance in the Mannar sector, what their next aim here is not clear. Even if its known, media reportage would
only constitute advance information to the enemy - which is one among a few taboos in this new century that has ushered in a communications
revolution that has impacted immensely on how wars are fought.
However, Defence Spokesman Keheliya Rambukwella told Thursday's news briefing that the next aim of the troops would be to re-capture
Kilinochchi, now the heartland of the LTTE. For reasons that are now too obvious, the pros and cons of such a move cannot be examined. So
are the analytical aspects arising out of them.
The second thrust of the Army, north of the Weli Oya sector, continues. Troops advance into the jungles ahead of them, before the LTTE's
main fortifications, weeks ago led to their seizing the once renowned 1-4 base. This is a camp complex where LTTE leader, Velupillai
Prabhakaran, was known to be hiding before and during the period when Indian Peace Keeping Troops (IPKF) were in Sri Lanka.
Thereafter, it had been abandoned. Troops also captured the "Michael Base." The guerrillas had weeks earlier abandoned this base after
blasting some of the buildings there. Army sources say guerrilla intelligence cadres who were scouting around the area occasionally used the 1
-4 base. At the time the troops seized the base, they found fresh evidence of a group of some eight to twelve cadres having cooked meals
there. If the re-capture of Vidattaltivu and its domination by the Security Forces would lower if not prevent altogether the exodus of refugees, an
irritant in Sri Lanka-India relations, there are other issues at sea that are causing equal if not more concern in New Delhi. The latest is the
killing, allegedly by the Sri Lanka Navy, of two South Indian fishermen from the coastal town of Nagapattnam and the wounding of another on
July 11. The incident is said to have taken place on the Indian waters off Point Calimere (the Indian coast across Point Pedro). The move has
triggered off pressure from the Tamil Nadu state Government on the Central Government in New Delhi.
So much so, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who is scheduled to arrive in Colombo next month for the summit meeting of leaders of
the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) in Colombo, is to raise the issue with President Mahinda Rajapaksa during
bi-lateral talks with him. Mr. Singh's Congress Party Government is facing a trust vote in Parliament on Tuesday raising an element of
uncertainty on his visit if the motion is lost.
The Sri Lanka Government has strongly denied allegations that the Navy was involved in any shooting incident. The Foreign Ministry in
Colombo issued a detailed statement. The move appeared to underscore the seriousness of the situation.
Here are edited excerpts from the statement commenting on Indian media reports:
"When reports of this nature are received, a rigorous procedure is instituted by Naval Headquarters in Colombo, in keeping with the firm
resolve of the Government of Sri Lanka to deal in a humanitarian manner with fishermen apprehended in Sri Lankan waters. The procedure
includes Naval Headquarters ascertaining from the Area Commands as to whether any vessels of the Navy were involved in operation in the
area of the alleged incident, as per the reported date and time. The preliminary findings in this case are that there were no Naval units operating
on the Sri Lanka side of the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) in the area off Point Calimere on 11th July.
"However, there was an incident that same night at 21.10 hours at a completely different location, namely approximately 8 NM (nautical miles)
East of Point Pedro when two Sri Lanka Navy fast attack craft deployed on a routine patrol detected on their radar, a boat moving in a
suspicious manner at high speed of around 34 knots.
"The night vision cameras of the Navy vessels further discerned the suspicious craft as having the configuration of an LTTE low profile boat.
The video pictures of the suspicious boat as recorded by the cameras are available with the Sri Lanka Navy, which it is willing to share with
the Indian Naval authorities, along with other relevant information. When the suspect boat failed to respond to warning to halt, the Naval craft
were constrained (sic) to open fire.
"It was not possible for the Navy vessels to assess the outcome of the action taken by them and accordingly the possibility of the suspect boat
having continued on its northerly course cannot be ruled out. The attached map (Annex 1) (Note: This was not released by the Foreign
Ministry to the media) provides the maritime location of the action taken by the Sri Lanka Navy vessels at 21.10 hours on 11th July. It is clear
that the incident took place well within the Sri Lankan territorial waters and around the sensitive area of Point Pedro, from where the LTTE
Sea Tiger wing has frequently engaged in terrorist activities, including attacking cargo and passenger vessels operating to and from the Jaffna
peninsula."The contents of the official statement were formally conveyed to Indian authorities through diplomatic channels. In addition, Sri Lanka's High
Commissioner in New Delhi, Romesh Jayasinghe, also met Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherji this week to explain the Government's
position.
Despite Sri Lanka Government's repeated assertions, the same sources in New Delhi said, the Indian Government has raised issue with Sri
Lanka at the highest levels. As a result, President Mahinda Rajapaksa has agreed to appoint a Commission of Inquiry in Colombo to probe
Indian allegations. This is besides the Government's own investigations that are already under way. There was, however, no official
confirmation so far in Colombo. Senior Government officials contacted by The Sunday Times declined comment. The modalities of the
proposed commission including its terms of reference, composition and mandate are yet to be determined, the same sources said.
Amidst this controversy, other issues have also cropped up. The Sri Lanka Navy said one of its patrols had apprehended an Indian national
whilst returning to Tamil Nadu by boat from Tiger guerrilla-dominated Wanni. He was apprehended and handed over to the Indian High
Commission.
It is in this backdrop that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherji , among others, are scheduled to visit
Colombo for the SAARC summit. This week, two high ranking officials of the Indain's Prime Minister's Special Security Group (SSG) were in
Colombo to further examine security conditions in the city and the immediate suburbs. Heightening Indian concerns are fears of any possible
attacks by Tiger guerrillas.
The Sri Lankan Government has shared the same concerns. So much so enhanced security measures have been taken weeks in advance of
the summit. The same consideration has led to using the Parliamentary Complex at Kotte-Sri Jayawardenapura as the retreat for the heads of
State and Government. There, they will take part in a lunch on August 3 that is being restricted to the leaders, their Foreign Ministers and the
Secretary General of the SAARC numbering only a maximum of 25. SAARC events will begin on July 27 with a meeting of officials. On July 31 and August 1, the meeting at Foreign Ministers level will be held at
the BMICH. A dinner hosted by Foreign Minister Rohita Bogollagama will take place at the same venue on the night of July 31. The summit
level meeting will be held on August 2 and 3. An event for wives of the visiting dignitaries is to be held at the Mount Lavinia Hotel.
The Government is expected to declare August 2 a public holiday on account of SAARC. All heads of State or Government arriving at the Bandaranaike International Airport will be flown by helicopter to their respective hotels.
Foreign Ministers and Foreign Secretaries will be escorted into the City by road for which one segment of the Colombo-Katunayake dual
carriageway will be closed. Contrary to media reports, there will be no large Indian military contingent from India. The maximum number of security personnel to cover
Premier Singh as well as Foreign Minister Mukherji and their entourages will not exceed 125, according to official sources. Besides a
helicopter for use by Premier Singh and his entourage, India is also providing another VIP transport helicopter at Sri Lanka Government's
request for use by visiting dignitaries.
The case of two Indian Navy vessels remaining berthed outside the Colombo harbour is also still under consideration, according to same
sources. "We have to respond to some procedural matters raised by Indian authorities," a defence source declared. During the period, India is
also to deploy Naval vessels on its side of the IMBL in the Palk Straits.
Since the Non Aligned Summit Conference in Colombo in 1976, this is the first time security considerations have become a nightmare for the
defence and security establishment. From now until the summit is over, there will be many a nervous moment. And more than the visiting
dignitaries, it is the Sri Lankan public who will be forced to bear the pressures imposed by the need for even stricter security. Under military
pressure, the threats posed by guerrillas, particularly outside the theatre of conflict, remain high. ----------------Vidattaltivu Liberated; terrorists suffer fatal blow [Updated] Gallant soldiers of Army Task Force 1 and Commando Brigade operating on the Mannar warfront liberated the strategically important
Vidattaltivu town this morning (July 16). Vidattaltivu is the largest town situated on the North- Western coast of the Island, 20 km North of
Mannar and used by the terrorists as their main Sea-Tiger base cum logistic hub in the West.
Soldiers of Task Force 1 on Tuesday evening (July15) commenced their forward march from their initial locations at the Southern limits of
Vidattaltivu town, i.e. few hundreds meters short of Vidattaltivu terror defence, located 2 Km South of the town. These troops were able to
capture a 2.5km stretch of the LTTE Forward Defence by late in the evening.
Unable to withstand the military onslaught, terrorists started to flee further northwards towards and later suffered heavy damages during their
withdrawal as the elite commandos flanking in the Northeastern boundaries of Vidattaltivu laid an ambush on them. The commandos
confronted with a group of approximately 60 LTTE cadres around 1.45 p.m. As the terrorist started to withdraw towards Iluppaikkadaval,
North of Vidattaltivu; commandos called in indirect fire. As a result, heavy artillery and multi barrel rocket fire were directed at the terrorists.
Also, Air Force launched close air support missions to ground troops using MI 24 helicopter gunships. Ground troops claimed over 30
terrorists were killed due to artillery and air assault while the rest turned tail.
Meanwhile, troops approaching from the East of Vidattaltivu cut off the Mannar - Poonaryn road at a location 2 Km North of Vidattaltivu
early this morning, besetting the terror stronghold from the South, East and the North. Later, troops marched into the town and declared the
area liberated for the first time since 1987.
Sources at the battlefield said that the soldiers approached from South had to cross a strong LTTE defence built on a 7 feet tall earth bump
with a deep ditch in front of it, before they entered into the Vidattaltivu town limits. This defence cut across the Mannar- Poonaryn road, 2
Km South of Vidattaltivu and ran 10 Km from the coast to Paramarayankulama, situated 8 Km South East of Vidattaltivu. At that, the
defence was consisted with fortified bunkers made out of thick wooden logs at every 150m distances.
Following the successful capture of the Mannar 'Rice Bowl' troops within 24 hours commenced their march towards Vidattaltivu. Troops
halted 200m South of the above-mentioned strong LTTE defence and waited until the new front opened up by the 582 brigade of the Task
Force-1 and the commandos to make their approach from the East. This new front opened up 10 Km East of Vidattaltivu managed to reach
Mannar - Poonaryn road North of Vidattaltivu within one week.
While conquering the strong defence line of the LTTE in the South, troops braved dense mine fields removing hundreds of anti personnel
mines, improvised explosive devices and booby traps. During last 10 days, troops expecting to bring up on maximum attrition rate over the
terrorists attacked and destroy a large number of bunkers situated along the LTTE defence. According to the ground and radio monitoring
sources at least 100 LTTE cadres were killed and equal number or more were wounded during these confrontations. Also, commandos alone
found 28 bodies of slain LTTE cadres during this period.
Commander of Task Force 1, Brigadier Shavendra Silva speaking to Defence.lk said that this was the first time that the Army dominated
Vidattaltivu area after 21 years. Not even during major military operations such as Ranagosa and Jayasikuru, army had been able cross the
strong LTTE defence that runs over 10 km East from the Southern coast of Vidattaltivu, he added.
Meanwhile, Defence observers are in the view that the loss of Vidattaltivu would cast a fatal blow on LTTE as it has lost the most important
Sea-Tiger base in the present context. According to them the terrorists has no other option than to shift their Sea-Tiger assets to a makeshift
camp further Northwards with the loss of its well-established sea borne operational base.
Following its loss of 10 arms carrying ships to Sri Lanka Navy, and the loss of land domination over Eastern coast to army and also due to
the strong sea blockade maintained by navy in the North-Eastern waters , the only available sea supply route for the LTTE has been identified
as the one across the Gulf of Mannar. Presence of large amount of Indian fishing vessels and less maneuverability available for the navy ships in
the coastal waters over the shallow continental shelf have made it virtually impossible to ensure complete denial of enemy use of sea lines of
communication. Therefore, the loss of Vidattaltivu, the best geographical location in the North-West coast for Sea Tiger operations will be a
huge loss to the terrorists than it is really depicted in terms of square kilometers, defence observers added.
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