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Paper no. 2684 28-Apr.-2008
Prachanda: From A Radical Maoist to A Lovable Mascot
By B. Raman
Since 2005, Prachanda, the leader of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), has become a lovable mascot of the liberal elite of the country----particularly in New Delhi. They see nothing but positive in him. His pre-2005 record has been forgotten---- the brutal massacre of innocent civilians in different parts of Nepal by the well-trained, well-armed and well-motivated insurgent army raised by him, his contacts with the Shining Path guerillas of Peru, his role in helping the Maoists in India, particularly in Andhra Pradesh, his fulminations against India, particularly against the Indian Army, his devotion to Mao Zedong's Thoughts, his raising of his insurgent army with the cladestine support of the royal family in order to use it against India, his turning the insurgents against the monarchy after having benefited from its largesse etc.
2. For the elite, he has undergone a remarkable metamorphosis. From a Maoist, he has become a Dengist---for whom pragmatism and not ideological rigidity should guide policy-making. His fulminations against India stopped. He embarked on a charm offensive directed at India and its elite. His supporters from the Indian elite welcomed him with open arms and took him round the corridors of power and the labyrinth of think-tanks in Delhi. They all hailed the born-again democrat, who wants nothing but genuine democracy in Nepal. He made it apparent in many of his statements in Nepal that he would not consider democracy as genuine unless it enabled him to become the President of a republican Nepal, but that did not sound a jarring note in New Delhi. The desire to encourage his seeming metamorphosis became the driving force of policy-making and the negative comments emanating from him from time to time were overlooked.
3. Anybody, who drew attention to his pre-2005 past and urged caution in assessing him and his metamorphosis was frowned upon and even abused. I was, therefore, not surprised by the torrent of abusive and denigrating messages, which were triggered off by my earlier article titled "Valid Reasons For A Military Take-Over in Nepal." As if I had committed an act of blasphemy by writing that article.
4. Welcoming an insurgent movement into the political mainstream and integrating it in the mainstream is a delicate process, which has to be handled carefully and gradually so that in our over-eagerness to achieve integration, we do not make the problem worse. We have a good record of managing the process of integration. We did so successfully with the so-called Naga Federal Government (NFG) under Indira Gandhi as the Prime Minister in the 1970s and with the Mizo National Front (MNF) under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Ministers in the 1980s. Indonesia has recently embarked successfully on a similar exercise for the integration of the Free Aceh Movement.
5. Many issues came up during the long negotiations with the NFG and the MNF--- such as, their giving up the use of violence and accepting the Constitution of the country, the Government accepting their legitimate demands relating to greater political and economic role, the rehabilitation of their armed cadres after they surrender their weapons and their participation in the elections.
6. Their participation in the elections, winning them and taking over power as part of an over-all peace settlement already arrived at before the elections came as the culminating stage of the process. Till the culminating stage, the negotiations were held between the Government on one side of the table and the insurgent leaders on the other side. The insurgent leaders were the negotiators of the process and not the decision-makers. The ground rules for the integration were decided upon by the policy-makers of the Government on the basis of the negotiations with the insurgent leaders, who had no role in finalising the ground rules and in implementing them.
7. The most difficult stage of the exercise is the integration and rehabilitation of the armed cadres as part of the process. All insurgent organisations demand that their armed cadres be integrated into the Army or at least the security forces. We did not agree to integrate them into the armed forces, but the Army was encouraged to make recruitment in the civil societies of the affected states to convince the people that they had been accepted without any mental reservations as part of the national mainstream. Eligible cadres of the insurgent organisations, who were not involved in murders or assassinations, were inducted into the local police and central police organisations. All decision-making was in the hands of the Government till the culminating stage.
8. In Nepal, the reverse has happened. Taking advantage of the popular uprising of 2006 against the widely-detested King, the Maoists entered the coalition Government, which replaced a Government of royalist stooges, and started dictating terms as to how the integration should take place. They themselves became one of the policy-makers to decide on the process of integration. The integration is taking place not on the basis of negotiations between the Government and the insurgents, but in response to diktats issued from time to time by the Maoists in return for their continued participation in the Government. They are all the time giving out discreet threats that if their diktats are rejected, they might quit the Government and revert to insurgency.
9. The holding of the elections to the Constituent Assembly before the ground rules for integration were agreed upon and the victory of the Maoists in the elections----significant, but not spectacular as projected by sections of the media--- have led to a situation where the Maoists will be at the head of a Government which will take crucial decisions on the post-facto legitimisation of the terrorist infrastructure raised by the Maoists and on the ground rules for the integration of their ideologically motivated and well-trained cadres. The moment the Maoists assume leadership in the seats of power and decision-making, will it be possible to resist their demands?
10. If the integration of over 3000 ideologically indoctrinated cadres of the insurgent army into the Nepal Army comes about, we will have to the west of us an army ideologically motivated by jihadi doctrines and to the east of us an army ideologically motivated by Marxism, Leninism and Mao's Thoughts.
11. There are two possible scenarios--- these fears turn out to be baseless and Prachanda turns out to be a genuine democrat and a genuine friend of India or Prachanda after the elections turns out to be different from Prachanda before the elections and takes Nepal on a road, which would be detrimental to our national interests.
12. While hoping for the first scenario, we must be prepared for the second.
13. Highlighting stark realities is not an act of blasphemy. It is an important component of threat analysis.

Note No. 443 30-April--2008
NEPAL: Problems in Post Election Scenario: Update No. 158
By Dr. S.Chandrasekharan.
Power sharing or Power balance? This is the question that is being discussed by various political parties in the formation of a new government.
While the Maoists take it that it is a mandate for their party to take over administration, others think that it is a fractured verdict and that there should be a balance of power.
The UML leadership which is still smarting on its poor showing and despite having withdrawn from the government is more keen to have a fair share power in the interim period rather than devoting their energy to rebuild and restructure their party. The party is floating a proposal that the three top posts- that of the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Constituent Assembly should be shared among the three top parties.
Prachanda on 21st April conceded that the constituent assembly election was not the mission but only the means to collectively write a new constitution. He added that since the people’s mandate did not give majority to any single party all the parties and the civil society should work together to write a new constitution but it should be under the leadership of the Maoists.
This position was further clarified by Prachanda in the central committee meeting taking place now in Kathmandu. He reiterated that his party will lead the government but all decisions will be based on understanding.
It appears that the Maoists do not want to have parallel power centres and while promising that they will not be dictatorial (Prachanda) they would only agree to power sharing.
The Nepali Congress which came a poor second has realised that the interim constitution has given them a new life and some of the leaders would like G.P.Koirala to continue as the Prime Minister. Whether one agrees with the Maoists that the elections have given them a mandate to lead the government or not, certainly the election is not a mandate for the Nepali Congress to lead the government now!
The problem lies in the interim constitution itself. It has two major laws
One- Every decision and action will have to be based on consensual politics. While the SPA and the Maoists stuck together to see through the CA elections at any cost - with the fractured results, growing distrust and a sense of betrayal from among the seven party alliance have made the latter more cautious and adamant. They understand that if the Maoists are allowed to take over the Prime ministership and lead the government, they cannot be dislodged for the next few years. Hence they are talking of power sharing and would like even the constitution to be amended to remove the two third majority required for any decision when a consensus cannot be reached and instead have a simple majority.
Two: The interim constitution is not an inclusive one- It recognises only the SPA and the Maoists. The Terain parties which will have a sizeable presence in the new CA assembly will not figure at all. So will be the case of other minor parties.
There are other legal problems that were not envisaged at the time of introducing the interim constitution. They are not major ones and can be resolved provided the SPA and the Maoists reach out to other parties that are outside the constitution and arrive at an understanding. These are
1. The interim constitution does not recognise the party with the largest representation. Here, the Maoists.2. The Prime Minister can continue so long as no consensus is reached for a replacement. Another can be elected only by a two third majority of the members. In the new dispensation Prachanda cannot replace Koirala without a consensus as there is no likelihood of two third of the members electing him. The reverse is also true. Prachanda cannot be displaced without a consensus or a two third majority voting against him. Neither will happen. .3. The council of ministers cannot be formed without a consensus of the parties- Here political consensus means the Maoists and the seven party alliance. The rest do not matter.4. The Constitutent Assembly which would meet soon cannot be considered complete until 26 members are added. Technically G.P. Koirala can nominate the members unless he is replaced before the CA meets.
The Maoists having staked their claims publicly will find it embarrassing to withdraw their claim. As recently as on 29th April, C.P. Gajurel declared that his party (CPN-M) will not allow a simple majority to either appoint or oust a prime minister. He added that they should get a chance to lead the government but will work in tandem with other parties.
The Maoists will not be able to run the government and the administration will be brought to a stand still as two third’s majority is unlikely to be obtained on all issues. They cannot use the YCL( some seem to think that they are just like Boy Scouts!) to take to the streets to pressurise the government as the latter will be their own government. But the MJF may apply the same method of being in the government and at the same time go for regular bandhs to bring Terai to a stand still.
It is therefore in the interest of stability and smooth running of a government that the interim constitution is amended so that all decisions can be taken on a simple majority. Already the MJF leader has demanded that the interim constitution should reflect the new realities and that all references to the SPA and the Maoists in the constitution should be removed. Some would say that the interim constitution is too sacrosanct a document to be interfered with. But haven’t they interfered with the constitution and in fact pre empted the constitutional assembly in abolishing the monarchy and declaring a federal structure for the State?
This amendment would also help the hitherto marginalised groups to have their presence felt. It is learnt that Prachanda is already talking to the smaller groups. The support of the Terain groups will be critical as their numbers with the Maoists would make up more than half the number in the assembly.
Indian Role:
Now that the period of “hand wringing”, selective leaks to exculpate oneself and bashing of intelligence agencies are over, it is time to have a hard look on Indo Nepal relations on the basis of the 40 point demand made by the Maoists before they started the People’s war in February 1996 and their election manifesto. No doubt they are making the right statements ( though once a while they are caught up in their own ideological mindset- like Bhattarai maintaining that India is still an ‘expansionist power’), it should not be forgotten that in Nepal for too long nationalism has been equated with anti Indianism giving rise to violence ( recall Hrithik Roshan incident).
The Indo Nepal Treaty should be immediately reviewed and already the Nepalese Press in building up a case that India has been foot dragging on this issue. This is also due to some Indian analysts claiming that the treaty benefits Nepal more. There is no doubt it is an unequal treaty and let there be a treaty if there should be one that would be equal and provisions reciprocal. On water resources, except for flood management projects, the initiative for other power projects should come from Nepal and not from India. The Mahakali Treaty is as good as dead and it should be left at that. Let the decision on the recruitment of Gorkhas also be left to the new government.
I recall one former Prime Minister known for his blunt statements said that India does not give anything gracefully and it has to be “kicked” to give. I would suggest- Do not return the kick but do not give.
One witty learned minister of Nepal who is no more, used to tell me that India is “useless to friends and harmless to enemies” I would say continue to be harmless to enemies , but be useful to friends!

Paper no. 2688 01-May-2008
CHINA: THE MYTHIFICATION OF IT BEING AN EMERGENT SUPER POWER
By Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
China with its double-digit economic growth and double-digit growth in defense spending in the last two decades or so has undoubtedly emerged as one of the major world powers to be reckoned with. However, to maintain that China has already arrived as a superpower or will emerge shortly as a superpower is purely a mythification. It is a mythification as it does not incorporate an objective analysis of China’s major vulnerabilities and lack of national attributes that go into making a superpower.
China’s mythification as an emergent superpower has an inherent strategic danger that China starts perceiving itself as the “strategic equal” of the United States when it is not. In the process, its imperial pretensions are added to and it results in China’s strategic delinquencies around the world.
China’s mythification of it being as an emergent superpower arises from a host of multiple sources mostly American and Chinese. The rest of the world buys their line of projections.
The United States mythification of China as an emergent superpower was an endowment by late President Nixon and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger in the early 1970s. The strategic aim of Kissinger was to enlist China into a quasi-strategic alliance with the United States following China’s estrangement with the USSR.
China outlived its strategic utility to the United States by the close of the 1980s and was in the process of swinging back to Russia after Gorbachev succumbed to all Chinese demands ranging from Afghanistan to Cambodia, in his famous Vladivostok speech. However, the mythification of China as an emergent superpower by the United States continued. This time the United States Department of Defense picked up this mythification of China as an emergent superpower to justify its increasing budgetary allotments to meet the looming China threat.
China reveled in this American mythification as it helped this nation, which at best was a regional power in military terms, to play the “China Card” against the Soviet Union.
Addedly, China itself was an active proponent of furthering the mythification of its emergence as a superpower for political and nationalistic reasons. Externally, it helped China’s political bid to project itself in the imperial grandeur of the lost Chinese Empire and also in the bid to subdue by political and military coercion its neighbours whose territories Communist China grabbed.
In terms of China’s domestic politics and control this China mythification helped in arousing extreme nationalistic passions and brutal suppression of its populace.
There is yet another new category of advocates propagating the mythification of China as an emergent superpower. They admit that China can never emerge as a superpower in the strategic and military sense, but that China has emerged as the global superpower in terms of exercising “soft power” globally when seen in African and Latin American context. This is as good as the misnomer that since China has already emerged as an “economic superpower” it therefore qualifies to be the global superpower in the strategic sense too.
This Author would like to assert that the contemporary intense debates on China’s emergence as a superpower gained intensity in the last decade or so. The twin reasons prompting this debate again seem to stem from United States strategic policies. The first reaction was from a group that “hoped hopefully” that China could emerge as the second superpower to countervail United States policies of unilateralism. The second group concludes that with the United States power in decline presently as a result of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is only China that can assume the role of the next global superpower.
Both summations though erroneous fuel the current mythification of China as an emerging superpower. The summations are erroneous because the United States comprehensive global domination is not in decline and nor is China anywhere close to attain global superpower status.
To assist in the full comprehension of what constitutes for a nation to achieve the status of a superpower, and this to provide the basis for further discussion in this Paper, two definitions by distinguished American academics are reproduced below:
“A superpower must be able to conduct a global strategy including the possibility of destroying the world; to command vast economic potential and influence; and to present a universal ideology.” “A country that has the capacity to project dominating power and influence anywhere in the world, and sometimes in more than one region in the globe at a time and so may attain the status of global hegemon.” This Paper attempts to examine the main theme of the mythification of China as an emergent superpower not by statistical analysis but on a more broader canvass incorporating the following:
China Nowhere Near to Displace or Equal the United States as a Global Superpower China Will Be a Minority in Any Emerging Global Powers Line-up China’s Survival as a Political Entity China’s Peripheries Strategically Turbulent China’s Acceptability as a Responsible Stake-Holder in Global Affairs China Nowhere Near to Displace or Equal the United States as a Global Superpower
The United States today is the only global superpower when measured comprehensively in terms of the two definitions quoted above. United States policy formulations are based on a global strategic blueprint and the United States commands the strategic, military and economic might to project US dominating power and influence in the world in more than one region at a time as now witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Can the above be said of China contemporaneously or even in the next four to five decades? Certainly not, if a strategic reality check is carried out on China which indicates the following:
China has no parallel web of strategic alliances or bi-lateral security relationships around the world like the United States strategic links with the Atlantic Community, NATO or its mutual security pacts in East Asia with Japan, South Korea etc. China has not established nor will it find regional acceptances to establish its forward military presences in bases around the world like the United States China’s global power projection capabilities in terms of aircraft carrier groups, strategic bombers, strategic airlift operations and amphibious warfare capabilities it possesses in this regard are limited regionally against Taiwan and South China Sea confrontations. China’s strategic nuclear assets are fractionally in size to those of the United States. Credible deterrence is a debatable issue. China has no global military intervention capabilities to enable coercive diplomacy in the absence of security alliances, agreements or military bases around the world. China’s economic power has been touted as one of its most significant strengths contributing to its superpower emergence. However, when economically measuring China, the following limitations need to be taken into account:
In a highly globalized inter-dependent global economy, China cannot for long insulate its economic strengths from global influences. China’s energy security on which depends its stupendous economic growth is hostage to United States control of global oil resources and sea-lanes of oil supplies. China’s economy can also be said to be a hostage of the United States as its major export earnings are from USA. The United States can exercise debilitating leverages over the Chinese economy. China’s industrial production advantages based on cheap labor are being eroded. In terms of political influence, China is restricted to countries like Pakistan, North Korea and some African and Latin American countries. China’s questionable membership of the United Nations Security Council as a veto-wielding power has not endowed it with similar political influence as enjoyed by other Permanent Members. China has hesitated in using its veto powers against the United States for discernible reasons.
China when measured both in terms of ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ cannot be said to be in the process of equaling the United States strengths as a global superpower, leave aside displacing it. This assessment holds good for the next four decades or so.
China Will Be a Minority in Any Emerging Global Powers Line-up
In terms of emerging global power line-up, various configurations are being projected by distinguished political analysts. Many seem to agree that the future global powers line-up will comprise the United States, European Union, Russia, China, Japan and India.
A new analysis by an exuberant young analyst predicts that the new world order will be dominated by three superpowers, namely the United States, the European Union and China. While one would not disagree that feasibility exists for a united and effectively integrated European Union ready to shoulder global security responsibilities to emerge as a superpower, the same cannot be said of China. China is neither united, nor effectively integrated and it has an unenviable record of being a globally disruptive power.
Whatever be the preferred choice from the above two configurations of the emerging global power line-up, one fact that strikingly stands out is that China in both cases will be the odd-man out and in a minority.
China has no strategic convergences with the other global major powers; in fact strategic contradictions exist between China and all the other entities in the global power line-up.
In civilizational terms too, China is the odd-man out in the global power line-up.
The United States, Japan and India have already taken notice of the implications of China’s military rise as one of the major powers. They have initiated some counter-strategies. The European Union too has woken to this fact as Europe has increasingly come under China nuclear missile ranges and the threats so posed.
If this is the reaction of the major world powers to China’s not-so-benevolent military rise, then what will be their reaction as China comes close to bidding for superpower status by 2050?
The global major powers will have no option but to act in concert to prevent China’s bid for superpower status as the national security interests of each one of them will be seriously impacted by such a strategic eventuality.
An intensified strategic hemming-in of China on a global scale would not be a far-fetched idea to arrest China’s rise to superpower status.
China’s Survival as a Political Entity
China has painstakingly tried to project for the last six decades that it is a “monolithic Communist giant” which has even successfully weathered the fallout of the USSR disintegration as the foremost communist giant.
The Chinese Communist Party has perpetuated its strong-fisted control over China so far by brutally stamping out political dissent and suppression of human rights and civil liberties. It cannot be maintained that the 1.3 billion Chinese are faithfully committed to and obsessed with Communist ideology with ‘Chinese Characteristics’. The reverse may be happening now with the growing economic affluence and the power of the Internet and ‘informationalized” world.
At some stage, which may not be far-off, China’s 1.3 billion Chinese may get prompted to shake-off the Communist Party Yoke of nearly sixty years. In such an eventuality the political disorder in China unlike the disintegration of the Soviet Union would be of deluge proportions.
The internal dissensions within China amongst its provinces and cultural identity differences between the North and South could even fragment China.
National cohesion and good governance are the essential pre-requisites of ‘national power’, China does not seem to have them today and this deficiency could worsen further.
On this count, the mythification of China as an emergent superpower becomes even more questionable and shaky.
China’s Peripheries Strategically Turbulent
China’s qualifications for classification as a superpower are primarily attributed to its large geographical size besides its population. In fact vast geographical size was the prime determinant when it came to the United States and the USSR, besides other recognized power attributes.
If that be so, what should not be forgotten in the case of China is that its significant geographical size is a product of its military occupation of the non-Han vast expanses of Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia after the Communists came into power.
Without Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia the remaining core of Han China just about qualifies to be a regional power. Without these minority regions and their vast natural resources, China’s strategic significance pales.
Tibet and Xinjiang today on China’s Western and Southern peripheries are strategically and politically turbulent. Despite years of Chinese Government noticeably sponsored sizeable Han migration into this region, the changed demographics have not been able to subdue uprisings against Chinese rule and demands for self-determination and independence.
China’s brutal suppression of uprisings in these two strategic regions is likely to generate insurgencies and other forms of asymmetric warfare against China.
These strategic peripheries with their increasing political turbulence offer tempting options for those interested in further strategic hemming-in of China.
China’s pre-occupations with such strategic distractions are significant vulnerabilities and which in any case would significantly impede her emergemce as a superpower.
China’s Acceptability as a Responsible Stake-Holder in the Global Affairs
The United States officials, think-tanks and academia have many a times been seen as propagating another myth that China should be assisted to emerge as a responsible stake-holder in global affairs. This again seems to be advocated for strategic reasons in that a China “amenable to United States only” prognostication would lessen China’s salience as a threat to US national security, even if it continues as a threat to other countries. In any case this premise has not worked as China has been right upto this minute engaged in actions globally which threaten US interests.
It would be fair to state that most of the world does not view China as a responsible stake-holder in global affairs, as its demonstrated record is to the contrary:
China’s propensity to use military force to settle disputes in its favor e.g. Korea, Vietnam, India and South China Sea. China’s notorious record of nuclear weapons and missile proliferation in the Islamic World noticeably Pakistan and through proxies like Pakistan and North Korea China’s support for insurgencies in South East Asia, South Asia, Africa and Latin America China’s military supplies to the Taliban for operations against US Forces in Afghanistan China’s creation of military client states to de-stabilize regional powers like India in South Asia and North Korea in East Asia against Japan. China’s acceptability as a responsible stake-holder gets adversely impaired in global affairs due to the strategically disruptive policies as outlined above.
A discerning observer can make out two distinct threads in the strategic delinquencies of China outlined above:
Firstly, China’s strategic policies are designed to generate disruptive or destabilizing currents in regions perceived by the United States as critical to its interests. Secondly, more deviously, China is attempting to further a “civilizational war” divide between the United States and the Islamic World. It is furthering the perception in the Islamic World that it is China only that is standing between the United States and the Islamic World and US attempts to dominate the Islamic World. Hence the pronounced WMD proliferation by China selectively to only Islamic countries. This is s sinister strategic policy. China’s strategic delinquencies may find favor or acceptability with the “rogue nations” of the world but they can hardly find favor and more importantly, acceptability from nations around the globe which subscribe to an orderly, peaceful and stable global order.
It is this record which prevents China from acquiring “natural allies” in the free world and which can be considered as a significant obstacle for China’s emergence as a superpower.
Concluding Observations
The mythification of China as an emergent superpower in Western analyses must cease. The dangers of China perceiving itself as the “strategic equal” of the United States stands pointed out in the Introduction to this Paper.
So should cease, the advocacy of Western ‘China Specialists’ to preach that the world must attempt to “understand China” correctly and so also its aspirations. This Author would like to assert that there is a bigger call on China to make deliberate attempts to make itself understood correctly to the rest of world and soothe their misgivings about China.
China legitimacy to emerge as a superpower in the future would greatly depend on its proving itself by demonstrated performances that it is a responsible stake holder in global affairs. Its present record is confined to being an irresponsible stake holder in Islamic World affairs.
China has a long long way to go to achieve global superpower status. In the interim it must attempt to dispel the following prevailing picture of China, vividly captured by an astute Western academic:
“Today Chinese party-state has selected a Chinese past to suit its authoritarian purposes” “China’s centrality and unity was at times a post-hoc rationalization for the grabbing of other people’s territory. “But the PRC is an empire in that it appropriates an imperial idea of China, re-inventing a 2.500 year old autocracy to control its population and hector non-Chinese neighboring peoples.” “The PRC regime, as a result, is dysfunctional in the world of nation states.” “Still as Beijing twists history and uses false maps of China’s periphery as weapons, autocracy is reinforced, the imperial sense vindicated, and the contradiction with a loosened society and freer economy intensified. China’s mythification as an emerging superpower would continue to remain as a myth till China on its own volition emerges as a “normal nation” in the comity of nations.
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila at yahoo.com)