Explaining Prabakaran’s persistent defiance :V. Suryanarayan

Explaining Prabakaran’s persistent defiance
V. Suryanarayan
Was the LTTE supremo’s latest Heroes Day speech an
illustration of characteristic defiance or an expression of a
significantly weakened situation on the ground and increasing
international isolation? Can there be a political way out of the
vicious cycle?
Thousands of Tamil guerrillas were “standing ready to fight” and
“we will overcome the hurdles before us” and “liberate our
motherland,” thundered Velupillai Prabakaran, concluding his
Heroes Day speech on November 27, 2007. A few minutes
before the LTTE supremo began his speech, the Sri Lankan Air
Force demolished the building that housed the Voice of the
Tigers. Three weeks earlier, in a similar operation, Tamil
Selvam, the leader of t he political wing of the Tigers, was
killed. What is more, the rest of the world was tightening its
screws on the terrorist organisation, with Washington in the
lead, banning the activities of Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation,
one of the major fund-raisers of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam.
Was Prabakaran’s speech an illustration of his characteristic
defiance, intended to boost the sagging morale of the cadres
and supporters? Was he hiding his despair and frustration
behind the high-flowing rhetoric? Before dwelling on the text
and the context, it is necessary to highlight certain important
elements of his behavioural pattern over recent years.
The Heroes Day (Maveerar Nal) is celebrated with great pomp
and show in the LTTE-controlled territory and also in countries
where there is a substantial Sri Lankan Tamil presence. The
lighting of the lamp by the supremo is to remember and
commemorate the martyrs who have sacrificed their lives for the
cause of Tamil Eelam. Sri Lanka watchers eagerly wait for this
event, for the speech is an official prognosis of the immediate
past and also contains indicators of future policy.
In his first Heroes Day speech (November 27 is also
Prabakaran’s birthday) following the withdrawal of the Indian
Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), he made two important
pronouncements: 1) Those who betray the cause of Tamil
Eelam must be killed; and 2) if ever Prabakaran betrays the
cause of Tamil Eelam, “you must kill him.”
For all his passionate commitment to the cause of Tamil Eelam,
he was influenced by Anton Balasingham, his comrade-in-arms
for several years. On a number of occasions, the LTTE’s
Political Advisor persuaded Prabakaran to make a tactical
retreat from the goal in order to win international sympathy.
Here are two notable instances:
When Chandrika Kumaratunga was elected President, she was
very keen on bringing about “ethnic reconciliation” and
expressed her readiness to initiate discussions without
preconditions. In his book, Politics of Duplicity – Revisiting the
Jaffna Talks, Balasingham recalled that Prabakaran was
“sceptical” of Chandrika’s gestures and felt they were only a
gimmick to win the support of Tamils as well as Sinhalese. It
was Balasingham who advised his leader that it would be
“politically prudent” to initiate a dialogue with Chandrika to find
out how “genuine” she was in resolving the ethnic conflict.
Balasingham also played a key role in the conclusion of the
ceasefire agreements between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan
government. Subsequent peace talks led to the Oslo
Declaration, where the Tigers committed themselves to “explore
a federal solution within a united Sri Lanka.” Professor G.L.
Pieris, the leader of the Sri Lankan delegation, is on record that
Balasingham was specifically asked whether agreeing to explore
a federal solution meant the Tigers had renounced the military
option. Balasingham replied “no,” because that was their
“fallback position.” He added: “Why do you want to dwell on
that because we have every hope and expectation that the
journey that we have embarked upon will take us to the
destination that we desire.” He continued: “Why is it necessary
for you to look at the worst side of things and be pessimistic?”
I have focussed on the “moderating influence” of Balasingham
on Prabakaran, because, for many years, the Political Advisor
drafted the Heroes Day speeches. The present team of
speechwriters clearly lacks Balasingham’s political savvy and
finesse. Not surprisingly, the speech delivered on November
27, 2007 was a litany of accusations and complaints against the
rest of the world; the only innocent person was Prabakaran;
and the only just goal was the independence of Tamil Eelam,
which can be attained only through violent struggle.
The major thrust of Prabakaran’s speech was the charge that
the international community was collaborating with Colombo in
marginalising the LTTE. The “partisan and unjust conduct of the
international community” has undermined the confidence the
Tamil community has reposed in it. The steady erosion of the
parity between the Tigers and the government; the slow but
steady construction of an ‘international safety net’ by the Sri
Lankan government; the exclusion of the LTTE from major
international conferences organised by donor countries; and
what is more, despite occasional protests against human rights
violations by the government, their readiness to strengthen the
government’s military capabilities — all these were frustrating
experiences for the Tigers.
Prabakaran has turned a Nelson’s eye to an equally important
reality. The killing of political opponents, the attacks on the
civilian population, the forcible recruitment of children into the
guerrilla army — these inhuman acts have created a sense of
revulsion against the Tigers in several parts of the world.
Mischievous and misleading
From an Indian perspective, the LTTE supremo’s reference to
the international community “making the same mistake that India
made many years ago,” the charge that Indian intervention in Sri
Lanka was part of its “regional expansion,” and the assertion
that the provisions of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement of July
1987 did not even devolve powers as the “Banda-Chelva Pact”
did are not just mischievous. They go against ground realities.
There can be legitimate criticism of many aspects of India’s
relations with Sri Lanka relating to the ethnic conflict. However,
it must be acknowledged that the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution was the first significant step towards devolution of
powers to the provinces. It was an attempt to have a new
constitutional arrangement for sharing power between the
majority and minority communities. What led to its failure were
the sharp divisions within the Sri Lankan government, the
opposition of the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), and the
intransigence of Prabakaran. Absence of a Sinhala consensus
and given the violent opposition of the Tigers, the 1987 accord
became a source of discord in Sri Lanka.
Equally relevant is Prabakaran’s unwillingness to understand
and, where possible, exploit the contradictions within Sinhala
society to the advantage of the Tamils. He has referred to the
“implacability” of Sinhala chauvinism, adding that the Sinhala
state was not interested in finding a peaceful solution; its
objective, on the other hand, was to “occupy the Tamil
homeland, destroy its resources and enslave the Tamil nation.”
The revolt within the LTTE and the use of the rebel faction by
the Sri Lankan armed forces, coupled with the ascent of
Mahinda Rajapaksa to power with the support of the JVP and
the Sinhala Urumaya, has put the clock back as far as peace
prospects are concerned. The Supreme Court-ordered de-
merger of the north and the east; the closure of the A9 highway;
the downgrading of the proposals made by the Tissa Witarana
Committee; and increasing emphasis on a political solution
within a unitary state are clear indicators that the chasm dividing
the Sinhalese and the Tamils has widened. Tamils living in
Colombo and adjoining areas were subjected to untold
humiliation when many of them were recently detained for
interrogation. If the military pressure on the LTTE is not
accompanied by political reforms, the reservoir from which the
Tigers recruit their cadres might expand in a significant way.
In its recent report, the University Teachers of Human Rights
(UTHR) has highlighted the irreconcilable positions of the two
contending parties. The LTTE would continue to argue the
futility of a political settlement with Sinhalese governments that
were incapable of honouring commitments made earlier. On the
other hand, those who advocate a military solution would point
to the intransigence of Prabakaran and rationalise the loss of
human lives as the inevitable consequences of a war imposed by
a secessionist and terrorist organisation on the state.
In Sri Lanka today (as W.B. Yeats memorably said in The
Second Coming), “the best lack all convictions, while the
worst/are full of passionate intensity.” While the Tigers,
maddened with arrogance, have set themselves on the path of
destruction, the government seems determined to follow the
military option, which, even if successful, can lead only to the
peace of the graveyard. The question is whether anyone can
display the courage, vision, and strategic and tactical skills to
navigate a just and sustainable political way out of this vicious
cycle.
(Dr. V. Suryanarayan is a leading scholar on the Sri Lankan
ethnic conflict. He retired as Senior Professor and Director of
the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies at the
University of Madras.) The Hindu