Inidan expansionist aiming Tamil National Leader Mr.Pirapakaran

(November, 03, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian)

"Many governments in the past have lived with an illusion like a current government in Sri Lanka; General Ashok Kumar Mehta spoke his mind clearly on Sri Lanka’s crisis nightmare in an exclusive interview with Sri Lanka Guardian.
We spoke to Gen. Mehta and he freely shared his view with us.
By: Nilantha Ilangamuwa with Gen. Ashok Kumar Mehta

Read Full Text of the Interview
Q. What do you think of the new political and military developments in Sri Lanka between Government of Sri Lanka and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam?
Ans: There are two aspects, military and political. On the military side, the government has changed tack and shifted the focus from the ethnic conflict to counter terrorism. By doing so, they have derived considerable international cooperation and understanding. The liberation of the East is a big feather in the military cap but this does not mean that the LTTE has been completely cleared from the East. There are known to be at least 200 armed Tigers in hiding and an equal number of sleepers. In addition there are the various Tamil paramilitary groups like Karuna and Pillaiyan and Tamil political groups chiefly EPDP. These are bound to come into conflict with one another in the future. Therefore the main task for the Army and STF will be in managing the East.
Colombo has been sanitised and made safer but this has consumed at least one Infantry Brigade and some Special Forces. The occupation of the East and security tasks in the Colombo region are bound to affect the troop strength available for operations in the North. The recent attacks on Anuradhapura and Yala demonstrate that the LTTE has both reach and resilience which go beyond the North East. On the political side, the devolution package remains an elusive as it has always been in the past. Despite the APRC with some 50-plus meetings the end product will lack a southern consensus as the TNA, JVP and UNP are formally out of it.
Q: We met for the first time at the International Counter Terrorism Conference at BMICH, Colombo a few days ago. That day you have spoken on what the Government of Sri Lanka can do to counter terrorism in Sri Lanka. Also you welcomed recent operations won by Government troops against the LTTE. Does the Anuradhapura airbase incident change all that and your views? Can you critique GoSL’s Counter Terrorism operations?
Ans: The Sri Lankan Security Forces are fighting a conventional war while the LTTE is using a mix of guerilla war, conventional tactics and terrorism. But it has to be noted that the bulk of the targets they have attacked are military ones. The objective of the SLSF is both the capture of territory and attrition - weakening the LTTE. The aim is to separate the LTTE from their support base of 400,000 local Tamils. The Air Force is supporting the Army and Navy in their operations against LTTE. In addition, the security forces have launched productive intelligence operations and the results are manifest in the targetted assassination of SP Tamilselvan and the success story scripted by the Sri Lankan Navy over the last ten months. It has virtually crippled the logistics lifeline of the Tigers which will require at least 12 months to restore.
The LTTE is trying to make inroads into Jaffna and the daily attacks against FDLs are designed to infiltrate their cadres into Jaffna.
Q. Is there a military solution to the current problem? In the light of Anuradhapura, is GoSL even capable of a military solution even if it were feasible?
Ans: Categorically no. But the Sri Lankan Government thinks there is. Many governments in the past have lived with this illusion. And paid dearly for it. The intention to liberate the North as was done in the East is bound to fail due to various reasons; notably there is no Karuna group to support the military; no one knows the Wanni region as it has never been under SLSF control. Further, the LTTE has very strong defences and an elaborate network of barriers and minefields. A protracted war can result in a humanitarian disaster especially if air and naval bombardments are combined with ground assaults. So the Sri Lankan government must rethink its offensive plans. Rather than open a new front it should consolidate its gains in the East and carry out focused development. The attack on Anuradhapura should caution the establishment.
Q. Some say there is no difference between LTTE bombs in Colombo on the one hand and the massacre of Tamils civilians in periodic riots from 1956 and government shelling of civilians on the other. Please comment on the origin of Terrorism in Sri Lanka. What are the recent influential factors leading to the build up terrorism in Sri Lanka?
Ans: I think all human beings have the gift, from God, of forgetting. A lot of forgetting has to be done by both sides in Sri Lanka. The LTTE calls itself a left-leaning people’s army. Please explain to me how the rights of the oppressed, no matter what their race, areserved when you blow up trains and put bombs in public places where the working classes congregate. I don’t think anything is served by repeatedly raking up issues of whether LTTE terrorism came up first or state terrorism. Sri Lanka is a polyethnic society. It needs a polyethnic polity. Both sides must demonstrate the ability to share power.
Q. As far as Tamil civilian deaths during military operations are concerned, do you see any substantive difference between Sri Lankan Army or Air Force operations and IPKF operations?
Ans: The IPKF did not use its air force in the manner the Sri Lankan Air Force is employed. Only armed helicopters were selectively used and there was no carte blanche bombing of targets. IPKF operations were guided by use of minimum force and minimum collateral damage. The IPKF was extremely conscious of civilian casualties especially in the Tamil areas because of the fact that there were several Tamil speaking infantry units. IPKF also had to be mindful of the reaction in Tamil Nadu. Overall, great care and extreme sensitivity about civilian casualties prefaced military operations.
Q. What are your observations on Tamil Youth Militarism in Sri Lanka?
Ans: I think militancy is a hallmark of the young. I just feel it wasn’t handled right – not in the case of the LTTE, not in the case of the JVP.
Q. Why did India support Tamil military movements in Sri Lanka in the past?
Ans: there was a specific geopolitical situation that warranted this. India did not want a problem on its shores and some Sri Lankan regimes tried to bring external powers into the Indian Ocean region that made India angry, alarmed and determined to retain some leverage in influencing politics in the region. There was a certain context.
Q. India is strongly opposed to terrorism but India strongly supports Sri Lanka Tamils and, it is no longer disputed, has even trained and armed Tamil militants. Why is this?
Ans: India strongly opposes terrorism, state sponsored or otherwise. If the Sri Lankan Government’s minorities feel oppressed and find echoes in India, it could become an even greater problem for both our countries. It is better to engage and address issues instead of using coercion.
Q. If the LTTE didn’t kill former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi could you please speculate on whether India would have backed the LTTE goal of Eelam?
Ans: Hard to say.
Q. How did Indian support, if any, help in recent defeats of the LTTE such as the loss of LTTE cargo vessels? In 2002 when the Sri Lankan army was trapped in Jaffna with some 30-40,000 troops close to being massacred, it is said that India stopped the advance of the LTTE. Is this true? What did India do?
Ans: India has provided usable intelligence and training to Sri Lankan Navy. The second part of your question is fiction
Q. A top level intelligence officer in Sri Lanka told me at a personal interview that India never supported the Sri Lankan military. Also he claimed that the joint patrol by both countries of the Indian Ocean is a joke. Is his comment true? Is this all an Indian drama with Sri Lanka?
Ans: I think you should ask the gentleman who told you. He seems to enjoy a lively sense of humour! By the way India is the biggest trainer of Sri Lanka's military – Army, Navy and Air Force. No other country gets as many vacancies as Sri Lanka on training course in Indian military training institutions.
Q. Hilary Clinton, wife of former US President Bill Clinton has said during an interview with the London-based Guardian newspaper that the Tamil Tigers are a liberation movement, not terrorists. What is your opinion on her comment?
Ans: I am not sure how familiar she is with the realities of this region.
Q. Please comment on the international implications of the LTTE and its threats to peace and stability regionally and more widely.
Ans: The LTTE is militarily at its weakest today. Gone are the days when liberation movements and human rights violations could move nations to act. TheLTTE may believe that support of the people of the north and east is with it, but the patience of international opinion is wearing thin with them. The overall international threshold of patience with ‘liberation movements’ is at an all time low. So it should not expect any backing from any established regime. Yes, if they are content to call themselves liberation guerillas on the basis of equipment and money they extort, steal and smuggle, I have nothing today about them.
Q. What do you feel abut the liberation of the East by Government of Sri Lanka? Does it advance the cause of peace by humbling the LTTE or retard the cause by making the GoSL feel it does not have to meet Tamil aspirations?
Ans: This is certainly a victory of sorts. One must remember that a guerilla force cannot be permanently defeated. The LTTE has been cleared from the East but retains a residual presence and over time can always recoup. The victory celebrations have a political connotation. They may be premature.
Q. After the arrest of the top arms procurer and smuggler of the LTTE, Kumaran Pathmanathan, better known as KP, you have said that this is the time to tame the Tiger. First, was KP really arrested? And second, could you give us your observations on LTTE’s military capabilities?
Ans: I think Thai authorities have said clearly –and so have the Indians – that the arrested man wasn’t KP. I don’t believe in conspiracy theories, only facts. The LTTE has acquired military capabilities against heavy odds. But they must realize that a military victory against the Sri Lankan state is impossible to achieve.
Q. LTTE has just attacked the Sri Lankan Air Force base in Anuradhapura a few days ago. This is the first time Prabhakaran has used a suicide team and Air Wing on a single joint mission. What do you think about the LTTE’s latest attack?
Ans: Of the four air attakcs carried out by the Tiger Air Force, this one is the most audacious and brilliant. The psychological pay off is much greater than the 21 out of the 24 Aircraft which have been disabled and resulting in the loss of $ 40 m The fact that the Black Tigers were able to damage or destroy almost every piece of equipment in sight barring the three helicopters which were parked away shows the skilful planning and execution of the operation. That 17 of the 20 Tigers blew themselves up shows nothing will stop them from carrying out even more daring attacks.
The combined ground and air attack also revealed big holes in Sri Lankan Air Forces' low level air defence and quick reaction capability. They have not ben able to bring down a single Tiger aircraft. That says something for both sides.
Q- Please comment on the death of S.P. Tamilchelavan who was the political wing head of the LTTE?
Ans: It seems they got the wrong chap. The targeted killing by the SLAF of Mr SP Tamilchelvan, the head of the political wing of the LTTE and the international face of the botched peace process signals the virtual end of any prospect of a negotiated solution. While the Sri Lankan Air Force may have demonstrated its talent in acquiring actionable intelligence and precision bombing, Tamilchelvan’s assassination is bound to lead to an eye for an eye and escalate the conflict still further.
The elimination of Tamilchelvan confirms the widely held belief that the Sri Lankan government is simply not interested in a political solution and is hell-bent on liberating the North as it has the East. The government is barking up the wrong tree.
Q. What are the responsibilities of Government of Sri Lanka?
Ans: To expeditiously evolve a devolution package which enjoys a southern consensus and offer it to the Tamils including the LTTE?
Q. Please comment on the ongoing operations against the LTTE by GoSL.
Ans: This question has been answered. The Northern offensive appears to be in two parts. The first is along the A 32 coastal road from Mannar to Pooneryn. This operation will ensure that LTTE guns will not be able to target Palaly airfield. The second front is in the Wanni area and it is believed that the Sri Lankan Army has made at least three incursions of battalion size in this area. But this is a long haul, fraught with risk and danger.
Q. What are the responsibilities of anti-LTTE Tamil political parties in this situation?
Ans: I think they must do everything possible to ensure devolution of power and a polyethnic polity. This is the fundamental issue and there is no pointbeing in denial about it.
Q. What are the weak points in the Sri Lanka government and military for counter terrorism operations?
Ans: There is excessive use of force and military operations are not compatible with human rights and humanitarian law of conflict
Q. Can the LTTE win Eelam?
Ans: No.
Q. Please comment on what you expect to be the forthcoming military strategies of the LTTE, and how government forces can counter them?
Ans: LTTE will continue to wage its war by employing a mix of conventional and guerilla tactics and terrorism. Government forces have to fight on all three fronts.
Q. Can Government of Sri Lanka ever annihilate the LTTE? If so how long would it take?
Ans: Never.
Q. How can Sri Lanka find a sustainable solution for the ethnic crisis? Also what are the responsibilities of the other political parties?
Ans: The Southern parties must work together on power sharing and evolve a dignified devolution package that will satisfy the Tamils and the Muslims and which is acceptable to all the people in Sri Lanka.

Paper no. 2445 04-Nov.-2007
MYSTERY BEHIND THAMILCHELVAN'S DEATH-INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO. 299

By B.Raman Normally, whenever the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) makes an air strike on areas held by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), it makes an announcement immediately after its planes safely return to base and a claim regarding the successes achieved. The LTTE then makes a counter-claim refuting the version of the SLAF.
2. In the case of the death of S.P.Thamilchelvan, the head of the political wing of the LTTE, supposedly in an SLAF air strike on November 2, 2007, this reportedly did not happen. The SLAF initially did not come out with any statement or claim.
3. It was the LTTE, which made the first announcement, about six hours after the alleged air strike and then the Sri Lankan Government went to town about it. There was apparently an air strike in the Kilinochi area at 6 AM on November 2, 2007, but it was not a targeted air strike directed to killing Thamilchelvan.
4. It did not make any sense for the SLAF to kill him. The LTTE has two wings--- a conventional warfare wing and a terrorist wing centred around the Black Tigers and the Black Sea Tigers. Karuna, the leader of the Eastern Province, who deserted Prabhakaran in 2004 and Thamilchelvan belonged to the conventional wing and not to the terrorist wing

5. Thamilchelvan was an acceptable face of the LTTE for the international community if it wanted to work towards an LTTE minus Prabhakaran and others involved in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi just as it worked for a Palestine Liberation Organisation minus Yasser Arafat. In fact, I have myself been suggesting this formula for many years in order to re-start the peace process again.

6. Since the interrnational community liked Thamilchelvan and his pleasant ways of interacting with people, many of his interlocutors were working towards making him see reason and make the LTTE break with its reputation as a terrorist organisation.
7. If the Sri Lankan Government also wanted to work towards this scenario, it would not have targeted him. Instead, it would have tried to spare him. One had the impression that this was its policy till now.
8. Sri Lankan officials, including its Defence Secretary, have claimed that they had pinpoint information about Thamilchelvan's place of residence and hence were able to target him. In fact, many knew his place of residence since he was freely receiving his foreign interlocutors there. He felt that the Sri Lankan Government would not target him since he represented the internationally-acceptable face of the LTTE and there could not be a revival of the political process without his playing a role in it.
9. Many well-informed persons with their ears to the ground feel there is more than meets the eye in the case relating to Thamilchelvan's death. They do not rule out the possibility that the LTTE's intelligence wing had him and his close associates killed and then put the blame on the SLAF, thereby killing two birds with one stone---it eliminated a possible rival to Prabhakaran and aggravated the anger against the Sri Lankan authorities. 10. According to these sources, in their anxiety to overcome the embarrassment caused by the LTTE's recent successful raid in the Anuradhapura base, the Sri Lankan authorities, instead of waiting and watching in order to analyse why the LTTE took the initiative in making the announcement, walked into the trap and claimed credit for eliminating him, thereby unwittingly providing a deniability to the LTTE's intelligence wing.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. )