A'Pura Attack: News and Views from Neighbour!

The Hindu (24-10-07) Opinion - Editorials
LTTE attack in military context

Pushed into the Vanni jungles and denied vital supplies as a result of a relentless year-long campaign by the Sri Lankan military, a desperate LTTE has scored a hit of modest military significance. The October 22 pre-dawn ground-and-air attack on the Anuradhapura air base in the North Central Province, leaving four military helicopters destroyed and 14 soldiers dead, was in reality a suicide operation by an organisation on the run. The modus operandi is typical of the LTTE. A 21-member suicide squad, in two formations, was let loose on the air base, wrecking everything in sight. Two light aircraft of the nascent ‘Tiger Air Force,’ which surfaced 70 minutes after the suicide offensive, appear to be of mere symbolic significance. It was the fifth aerial foray since the Tigers made their debut in the skies in March 2007 targeting the air base near the only international airport of the country at Katunayaka; and the first after the Sri Lanka government put in place a revamped air defence system. By demonstrating its ‘air power,’ in the melee of the suicide attack at Anuradhapura, the LTTE hopes to bolster the sagging morale of its cadres.
Militarily and politically, the LTTE has been in dire need of an Anuradhapura-type attack — as in the last several months it has taken a severe beating from the Sri Lankan armed forces. Since its ouster from the east in August, the terrorist organisation has failed to conduct any military operation of significance notwithstanding the fissures within the Karuna group and general unrest in the east. Contrary to predictions from several quarters, Colombo has been safe. According to the Sri Lankan Navy, the LTTE has lost all of its ten ships, ferrying supplies from various clandestine sources, in one-sided sea battles. Eight of these losses were in 2007 and the other two ships were sunk in Indonesian waters. According to informed estimates, which are not contested by the LTTE, 200 of its cadres were killed in the past one month. For the first time in years, the Sri Lankan army made territorial gains in the north by capturing a Tiger base in Mannar. However, the armed forces face a few troubling questions. The new radar detected the intruding aircraft, yet they were able to operate in the air space for at least 30 minutes and return to their base. And what explains the failure of the armed forces to detect the infiltration of a large suicide squad right into the compound of a vital air base? The LTTE operation shows up continuing weaknesses in Sri Lanka’s intelligence machinery and in the capability of the armed forces to secure the air space even against sub-military threats.
Hight Lights: ENB

India steps up maritime vigil

The Indian Navy and Coast Guard have mounted a strong vigil along India’s maritime borders with Sri Lanka following Monday’s LTTE attack on the airbase in Anuradhapura.
Indian Navy and Coast Guard ships were patrolling the maritime border to check any possible infiltration into Tamil Nadu. The Indian authorities have foiled several previous attempts by the LTTE to infiltrate the region, arresting several persons and seizing military equipment.
India has also strengthened its air defences in the wake of LTTE acquiring an air capability.
The Indian Navy has also decided to establish a Naval Observation Post at Seeniappa Dharga near Mandapam in Ramanathapuram district in Tamil Nadu to check smuggling activity in the Gulf of Mannar area bordering Sri Lanka.
The decision assumes significance following intelligence inputs that smugglers operating from the Palk Bay and the Palk Straits may be trying to shift their activities to the Gulf of Mannar.
Official sources told PTI that fishermen in Rameswaram had been cautioned not to cross Indian waters. A total of 693 fishing boats had put out to sea from here in the wee hours of yesterday.
The Sri Lankan Navy has denied charges that it was harassing Indian fishermen.
The Sri Lanka Navy has also stepped up reconnaissance and patrols along the maritime border.
“We are on the alert and monitoring the situation on the sea. The situation is very much under control,” Navy Spokesman D.K.P. Dassanayake said. Earlier this month, the Navy sank a ship carrying arms for the Tigers in the deep sea. The ship, carrying 3,000 tons of weapons and ammunition, was the seventh Tiger vessel sunk this year.
The Navy also attacked and destroyed a number of smaller vessels carrying weapons for the LTTE.

B.Raman's Two Papers

Paper No 291:LTTE Attacks Anuradhapura Air Base International Terrorism Monitor
By B.Raman

Despite bad weather, two aircraft of the so-called Tamil Eelam Air Force of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) managed to provide air cover to a ground attack launched by a specially-trained commando unit of the LTTE on a Sri Lankan Air Force base at Anuradhapura, 212 kilometres north of Colombo, on October 22, 2007. The LTTE aircraft first appeared over the air base and dropped two bombs. Taking advantage of the resulting confusion in the air base, the LTTE commandoes infiltrated the base. The resulting exchange of fire between the Sri Lankan forces guarding the base and the LTTE commandoes lasted about two hours between 3 AM and 5 AM.
2. While the LTTE disseminated its version of the joint operation shortly after it had ended, the Government version came about an hour later. Both versions said that two Russian-made MI 24 helicopters parked in the air base were affected. While the Government version said the helicopters were damaged, the LTTE version said they were destroyed.
3. The two versions also said that a third helicopter (Bell 212) was destroyed when it crashlanded at Doramadalawa, 13 kms east of Anuradhapura. The Government version said four airmen were killed during the crashlanding. It also said that the helicopter had taken off to take action against the LTTE commandoes, but it developed technical trouble. According to the LTTE version, two pilots and two engineers stationed in the air base tried to flee in the helicopter when the LTTE launched the attack. They were killed when they lost control of the helicopter and crashed on the ground.
4. Neither side has given any further details. Some Pakistani Air Force pilots are based in Anuradhapura to train pilots of the Sri Lankan Air Force. None of them appears to have been affected by the LTTE attack. This is the fourth air strike launched by the LTTE since March 26, 2007, when the LTTE brought its long-concealed aircraft into the open and used them for its operations. Two of the previous attacks were on targets in Colombo and the third was on a target in the Jaffna area. All the four attacks were at night. The last attack from the air was on the Delft naval base in the Jaffna area on the night of May 24, 2007. Since then, the LTTE has not used its air power despite its repeated threats to attack economic and other strategic targets in the Sinhalese areas. This had given rise to speculation that it might be facing spare parts or fuel procurement problems.
5. Since May, the LTTE has been going through serious operational difficulties. The flow of funds from its overseas supporters has declined due to action taken against them by their host governments. Its arms procurement network has also had a number of set-backs due to actions taken against them by foreign governments. Its sea transport capability has been damaged by some successful operations mounted by the Sri Lankan Navy. It has practically lost control of the areas in the Eastern Province, which were previously under its control.
6. Despite this, the morale, the motivation and the determination of its cadres remain strong. Its resilience as an organisation is intact. There has been no decline in their ability to innovate and take the adversary by surprise. However, the attrition in resources suffered by it is having an impact on its operations. It is now taking a longer time than in the past to plan and mount a major terrorist strike. This is because mobilisation of resources----human and material---is taking a longer time.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.)

Paper No. 292 LTTE’s Anuradhapura Raid: Bravery & Precision

October 23rd, 2007
By B. Raman

Reliable details of the combined air and land attack launched by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on the Anuradhapura air base of the Sri Lankan Air Force early in the morning of October 22, 2007, indicate that it was neither an act of desperation as projected by the embarrassed Sri Lankan military spokesmen nor an act of needless dramatics as suggested by others. It was an act of unbelievable determination, bravery and precision successfully carried out by a 21-member suicide commando group of the Black Tigers—significantly led by a Tamil from the Eastern Province— with the back-up support of two planes of the so-called Tamil Eelam Air Force.
2. Reliable Western sources say that no other terrorist organisation in the world would have been capable of organising such a raid, which had been preceded by painstaking intelligence collection, planning and rehearsal. The commandoes, divided into groups, infiltrated into the air base from two directions and, within 20 minutes, took the security guards by surprise, overwhelmed them, seized their weapons and communication equipment, neutralised a radar and an anti-aircraft gun position and then intimated their headquarters that they were in effective control of the air base. Only then the two aircraft of the LTTE’s air wing flew to Anuradhapura and dropped two bombs on the base and flew back safely to their hide-out.
3. The commandoes remained in effective occupation of the base from 3 AM to at least 9 AM. During this period, they blew up three helicopters, two fixed-wing aircraft—one of them a trainer— and three unmanned drones. After losing communication with the air base, the Sri Lankan Air Force base at Vavuniya sent one of its helicopters to Anuradhapura to find out what had happened. As it was approaching the air base, it was shot down by the LTTE commandoes manning the anti-aircraft gun in the air base.
4. The commandoes also blew up an ammunition storage depot in the air base and damaged its runway. It is learnt that the Black Tiger commandoes remained in communication with their headquarters till 9 AM. Thereafter, all communications ceased, indicating thereby that all of them had either been killed by the Sri Lankan Security Forces or had committed suicide to avoid falling into the hands of the Sri Lankan security forces, who had counter-attacked the base. Thirteen SLAF personnel were killed, nine inside the base and four in the helicopter crash.
5. The LTTE has been silent on the fate of the commandoes. However, it has released their personal particulars. Two Lieutenant-Colonels, six Majors, 12 Captains and one Lieutenant rank Black Tiger members took part in the operation. A Lieutenant-Colonel who led an attack team was from Trincomalee, two of the members, a Major and a Captain, were from Batticaloa, one from Mullaiththeevu, one from Mannaar, three from Ki’linochchi and eleven members from Jaffna .Three Captains were women.
6. Initial reports of the raid had indicated that the raid started with an air attack by the LTTE’s aircraft and that it was only thereafter that the commandoes had infiltrated into the air base by taking advantage of the confusion. Subsequent reports, however, indicate that the Black Tigers initially infiltrated the base and took control of it and that it was then that the air raid was launched more to test the capability for co-ordination between the air wing and the Black Tigers than to cause damage to the base. Since the Black Tigers were already in effective control of the base, they did not need any air support.
7. Embarrassed by the spectacular display of the LTTE’s prowess, the Sri Lankan authorities have been trying to play down the successes of the LTTE operation. They claim that only two helicopters and one fixed wing aircraft were damaged and another helicopter was destroyed when it crash-landed due to technical reasons. The Colombo correspondent of the “Daily Telegraph” of London has reported that the Black Tigers destroyed an expensive Beechcraft surveillance plane worth £14 million, two Mi17 helicopters, two Mi24 helicopters, three unmanned aerial vehicles, a K-8 jet and eight PD6 propeller trainer aircraft.
8. The Anuradhapura air base was essentially used by the SLAF as a training base. The training command of the SLAF was located there. In addition, it was also providing intelligence support to the SLAF and the Navy through the sophisticated Beechcraft plane fitted with equipment for aerial photography and the collection of electronic and technical intelligence and the unmanned drones. Instructors from Pakistan, China and Israel were periodically attached to the base.
9. The helicopters destroyed by the Black Tigers were being used as helicopter gun ships or for VIP transport. While the damage sustained by the SLAF is considerable in money terms and reduces its capability for intelligence collection for air and naval operations, its impact on the SLAF’s capability for air strikes over the LTTE controlled areas would be limited.
10. The successful operation would seem to have been launched by the LTTE in retaliation for the recent operations of the Sri Lankan Navy against the transport ships of the LTTE and the air strikes of the SLAF over LTTE positions in the Northern Province. It once again underlines the LTTE’s reputation as an organisation with a tremendous tenacity of purpose, grit and sophistication in thinking and planning. Its recent set-backs have not weakened its morale. They have only redoubled its determination to keep fighting for its political objective unmindful of the losses in the Eastern Province. [Courtesy: SAAG]