Thursday, 23 August 2007

Sri Lanka hunt turns to Tigers in NORTH


Sri Lanka hunt turns to Tigers in north
By Ajai Sahni

With the eviction of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from Batticaloa, capital of Sri Lanka's Eastern Province, and the Tigers' eventual collapse in the Thoppigala jungle area (Barron's Rock) on July 11, the expulsion of the rebels from their strongholds in the province was complete.
Well before these successes, outlining the strategy of the Sri Lanka Army on January 4, SLA commander Lieutenant-General Sarath Fonseka said, "After eradicating the Tigers from the east, full strength will be used to rescue the north."
This broad perspective has been powerfully underlined by President Mahinda Rajapakse, who on July 9 vowed to "wipe out" the LTTE from the Northern Province, declaring that blunting the rebels' military prowess was the only way to achieve permanent peace in the country. The president's assertions have found strong support among his political allies and constituencies, principally within the Sinhala right.
With a tremendous surge in confidence in the SLA and a continuous escalation of political rhetoric at the highest level, a northern offensive appears increasingly likely. Indeed, firefights along the current forward defense line, both in the Jaffna Peninsula and along the mainland north of Vavuniya, are daily occurrences. SLA sources also said "long-range operations" deep into LTTE territory were begun in a campaign of attrition intended to weaken the rebels in their final bastion. These operations have created some difficulties for rebel movement along roads in LTTE-controlled areas.
Nevertheless, a high measure of caution - contrasting significantly with the character of the public postures and rhetoric - characterizes the present military perspective. While it has long been believed that the LTTE's prowess has been exaggerated, and that its forces have suffered substantial declines in recent years due to the "Colonel" Karuna rebellion in the east and the December 2004 tsunami, there is general agreement that the group is capable of rebounding. The remaining area under LTTE control is roughly 7,500 square kilometers, and the topography and terrain of the north, with dense tropical jungles across vast stretches, favors guerrilla forces.
Further, some of the major LTTE citadels are in densely populated civilian areas - including the "political headquarters" at Killinochchi - and a frontal assault would be exceptionally bloody. Historically, the LTTE has tended to position its defenses, including its artillery, in civilian concentrations to raise the risk of collateral damage in the event of an attack. Indeed, Killinochchi has never been subjected to any military pressure - including aerial attack - because of its concentration of public offices, hospitals and residential areas.
Further, the Northern Province has repeatedly undergone ethnic cleansing and is now exclusively Tamil - and principally "Sri Lanka Tamil", the primary ethnic support base of the LTTE, with only small numbers of "plantation Tamils" (later immigrants from India, principally indentured labor brought in by the colonialists), who are generally looked down on by the LTTE leadership. This creates limited avenues for intelligence flows to the SLA and will act as a significant constraint.
The SLA also remains aware of the risks of a rear-guard campaign of terrorism, hit-and-run attacks, and frustrating harassment in the east. While most surviving LTTE cadres have filtered out of the Eastern Province, seeping gradually toward the north, the potential for a rash of guerrilla and terrorist attacks remains.
The LTTE leadership has explicitly warned of guerrilla action in the east, and consolidating government presence in the province will remain a significant challenge over the foreseeable future. This will increase demands for military manpower, and reduce the probabilities of a major northern offensive. The government has announced a 180-day "Accelerated Eastern Development Program" (also named "Reawakening of the East") that is intended to consolidate its position in the Eastern Province. The police and civil administrations have been put in charge of the program in an effort free the bulk of the military forces for operations in the north.
The LTTE's forces concentrated in the north remain substantial and are being renewed in terms of both manpower and weaponry. While accurate estimates of their strength are virtually impossible, according to government sources, some 3,087 LTTE were killed in action between December 2005 and August 2, 2007, with another 1,589 wounded.
The LTTE is currently thought to have roughly 7,000 soldiers, including a significant number of child recruits. Moreover, there are roughly 600,000 civilians in the LTTE-controlled areas, and the LTTE enforces a norm of one person per family to be recruited into its army. Further, all civilians of "fighting age" (including a significant proportion of children, principally aged 14-16, but sometimes younger) are required to undergo two hours of military training every day. While much of this mobilization is coercive, the LTTE would clearly be able to muster a very substantial force for any full-blown conflict with the SLA.
Weapons used by the LTTE in recent battles, as well as numerous seizures by the government, suggest a considerable and varied arsenal, including artillery, a limited supply of surface-to-air missiles. mortars, machine-guns, mines, large quantities of explosives (more than 5,375 kilograms were seized by the government between December 2005 and this month), and huge reserves of small arms.
The resupply of LTTE arms is continuous. The "Sea Tigers" are charged with the task transporting weapons, according to Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) sources, from Cambodia and Indonesia. The Sea Tigers have an estimated 450 senior cadres and another 250-300 lower-level cadres.
The current fleet consists of 60 improvised high-speed fighting craft (each with four 225-horsepower outboard motors brought in from Australia), capable of attaining speeds of 38-40 knots, and at least another 15 "logistics boats" for transport. Despite a number of devastating "wolf-pack attacks" with up to 20 speedboats - including three to four suicide boats packed with explosives - attacking SLN vessels in the past, the SLN has been successful at interrupting Sea Tiger movements along the east coast.
Weapon consignments are now transferred to civilian vessels - including commandeered Indian boats - outside Sri Lankan waters, to the south of the country, and are then transported along the west to the north. They reportedly enter Sri Lankan waters from the Indian side at Rameshwaram, under the cover of an estimated 300-400 Indian fishing boats that cross over into Sri Lankan waters every day. Interdiction in this case has been difficult, and has also resulted in some friction between Sri Lanka and India, as the fishing boats have been targeted.
Militarily, Sea Tiger capabilities are insignificant. They are capable of inflicting a huge disruption of civil and military (including food) supplies to government-held Jaffna, which relies entirely on sea and air transportation from Trincomalee, Muhamallai and India for its needs. However, as one senior SLN officer expressed it, "Boat to boat, they have nothing compared [with] what we have. If push comes to shove, the navy will take over. In an all-out situation, we will win."
The "all-out situation" is what the LTTE is now desperate to prevent. This is the first time in nearly two decades that the initiative appears to have slipped entirely out of its hands, and where it has been forced into an entirely defensive position. The LTTE has, consequently, launched a strident campaign emphasizing alleged human-rights violations by government forces, as well as a campaign for the creation of political conditions for the resumption of negotiations - including the ouster of the present hardline regime, and the restoration of a government led by Ranil Wickremasinghe, whose commitment to the peace process and a negotiated settlement is well known.
In Colombo, opinion is progressively hardening in favor of continued military operations, even among advocates of a negotiated solution. These voices feel that pressure must be exerted on the LTTE if it is to be brought to the negotiating table in a measure of greater good faith. President Rajapakse, on the other hand, believes that military pressure, combined with the evolution of ideas that could help arrive at an equitable political solution, are the necessary prongs of present strategy.
The Accelerated Eastern Development Program is one step in this direction, and its successes are expected to have an impact in the north as well by using military force to separate the LTTE from the general Tamil population. This perspective is, however, diluted by rising concerns about the capacity of the economy to bear the costs of the war over an extended period. With the unequal military balance between the conflicting forces, and the LTTE's limited capacities for positional warfare, the Tigers can be expected to escalate terrorist attacks across the country as pressure mounts in the north.
Clearly, no tidy "surgical" solution - negotiated or military - is possible in Sri Lanka within the present framework. A process of stabilization in the east, and of attrition in the north, has been initiated by Colombo. But to meet all of its objectives, a broader military offensive in the north will become inevitable.


Ajai Sahni is editor of the South Asia Intelligence Review and executive director of the Institute for Conflict Management.
Published with permission from the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal


Drug bill to double next year Nadira Gunatilleke
COLOMBO: The country’s annual drugs bill is set to double next year due to doctors preferring to prescribe brand name drugs instead of the generic equivalents, a Health Ministry spokesman said.
Another reason for the increase is the tendency by doctors to prescribe expensive drugs when drugs of the same quality are available at cheaper rates, the spokesman said adding that doctors are being influenced by multinational drug companies to follow such a course.
He said the annual expenditure on drugs have increased from Rs. 16.5 billion to Rs. 19.2 billion between 2006 and 2007. But allocated funds for annual drugs purchasing have only increased from Rs. 7.4 billion to 10.1 billion.
Healthcare and Nutrition Minister Nimal Siripala de Silva had requested intern doctors to prescribe affordable medicine as much as possible because the intention of all doctors should be saving money for the country and avoid taxing the poor to fatten multinational companies.
Minister de Silva had stated that a special committee comprising the Government Medical Practitioners Association members and representatives of the Medical Supply Division has been appointed to look into the matter and introduce cost cutting measures.
The Minister requested the committee to submit its report quickly to present it to Parliament aimed at introducing new laws compelling doctors to prescribe drugs only by their generic names and to control prescribing expensive drugs.
Healthcare and Nutrition Ministry spends 24 per cent of its budget for purchasing drugs and surgical items. The estimated sum for this in 2007 is Rs. 19,000 million.
For example the Government spent Rs. 22 million to purchase Vitamin C in 2006 which can be totally stopped and another Rs. 22 million to purchase Mehtyl Dopa which is prescribed only by specialist doctors.
Rs. 78 million had been spent over Simvastatin which can be cut down by 90 per cent by prescribing atorvastatins. The money spent over surgical gloves is Rs. 418 million which can be purchased locally by calling tenders for competitive prices.

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