ENB: DOCUMENT, GORDON BROWN GOVERNMENT

Interview transcript: David Miliband

Published: July 8 2007 22:14 Last updated: July 8 2007 22:14

This is a transcript of an interview with David Miliband, foreign secretary, by James Blitz, the FT’s political editor, Daniel Dombey, diplomatic correspondent, and Philip Stephens, chief political commentator, conducted on Friday July 6. It is unabridged and has been edited for clarity.

FT: Just to start, you’ve been here a week, mugging up on all parts of the world. Just, what do you make of it, what’s your view of the FCO, the issues that now confront you.
DM: I make of it first, that you’re not human if you don’t occasionally pinch yourself. Because it’s true that the global is domestic now, and so if you’re the foreign secretary, you’re at the centre of some very, very big questions.
Secondly, I’m struck that there is a real sense of purpose about the organisation. People are here because they want to make a difference. The caricature that this is an institution that does process, not outcomes, is not right.
And I’m struck that there are some real opportunities as well as some obviously huge challenges. So I feel very engaged about it actually, and really, it’s sort of… I think I said to you on a previous occasion, that when I used to go into the cabinet meeting in my previous incarnation, it was important to remember that an awful lot of Labour politicians came into politics and never got the chance to be in the cabinet.
So, I feel a great sense of privilege and I don’t say that idly. I say that with a sense of responsibility as well.
And what I said to the staff – I did an event for the staff on the day I arrived, and then we did a staff meeting – what I said to them was that I believe the Brown government has a very clear idea of what will make for a better Britain. It has a very, very clear idea about the need for Britain to be a more open society that retains its sense of community, an equal opportunity society that retains its sense of community. It has a very, very clear and defining theme about giving more power to individuals and communities without becoming sort of anarchic.
And it also has a very clear idea that successful countries in the 21st century will have global links at the level of the individual. I don’t just mean Facebook or the internet, but at the level of the company, at the level of the city, and at the level of the nation. And so, what I’ve been trying to say here, is that Gordon Brown’s vision of a better Britain has a really critical requirement for an active and engaged foreign policy.
FT: But if you say, look at Britain, do you see Britain as still a great power?
DM: It’s a great country.
FT: Yeah, is it a great power, a global power, or I think as one prime minister said, a pivotal power? How do you situate it?
DM: I think that we have… I don’t want to compete on sort of adjectives, and when Tony Blair talked about “pivotal”, he was making a different point than “great” I think, and it carried with it a different connotation. I think that we have a unique set of alliances. I think that we have some unique assets, and I think part of my job is to harness those assets to, if you like, build a better world.
FT: Just explain that, the unique assets, and unique alliances.
DM: I think the unique alliances are obviously that we, it’s not a new thing to say, but we’re a country that brings together an alliance in Europe, an alliance with the United States, an alliance with some vital developing countries like India. Those are a unique set of alliances, and we’re a P5 member.
And I think that is very, very significant. So that gives us relationships with other great powers, and I think that some of the unique assets, are that we are… I think we’ve got the opportunity to be a global hub, is the way I’d put it. We’ve got the opportunity to be a global hub economically, and you can see that demonstrated through the City of London, but you can also see it through even this week’s inward investment report.
We have the opportunity to be a global hub culturally. And of course the British Council is funded in part from here. And we can be a hub politically as well, and I think that’s important. But I think that it’s very, very important that we don’t…in the end, it’s about delivery, and so I think rather than putting grandiose titles on our impact on fate, it’s better to do big things rather than say you’re going to do big things, or be part of important things. So, that’s what I would say.
FT: Global hub is your phrase, what do you mean by that?
DM: Well, it is now I suppose. I hadn’t written that down as my top line, but I think that is an important way of thinking about it. And the big message that I think comes through is this. If, for the sake of argument, you say it’s right that successful countries in the 21st century will need to be open but with a sense of community; empowering people without becoming anarchic and globally linked. And if for the sake of argument you say that the nature of the global link has to be first to be able to play a big role in building a safer and better world, and on the other hand, leveraging the ideas, the markets, the assets of the world to build a better country. Say for the sake of argument, that those two sets of propositions are correct, you then yield a proposition, that foreign policy has to be both outward facing, playing a global role, but also drawing the world in and making the most of the world’s markets and ideas and cultures for your own country.
That then has a very, very clear implication which I think has run through every day of the briefings, meetings etc that I’ve done: which is that Britain must not retreat from the world. Some countries are having great debates about whether they want to be part of a globalised world. The very, very strong desire and imperative that I bring to this office is that now is not the time for Britain to retreat from the world, it’s vital that we do not retreat from engagement with the world, we have to engage in new and different ways, and I’m sure we can talk about that. But I think that the imperative of global engagement defines the challenges for this office, and they are about maximising the – in sort of FT speak, rather than speak that one might use in other contexts – they are about maximising the opportunities of globalisation and minimising the risks. That would be my pitch.
FT: What do you mean by a global hub politically? I mean, it’s fairly clear what a global hub culturally and economically is. If you’re talking about a global hub politically, does that mean that there is some kind of re-equilibrium, rebalancing between the US and Europe?
DM: I’ve said I don’t want to be grandiose, so I’m not proposing that we move the UN to London, but re-equilibrium between?
FT: Well, I mean for example between the US and Europe. When you talk about the global hub politically, it’s less clear what that means than on an economic or cultural basis.
DM: Yeah, maybe hub is not the right metaphor, but I think we’ve got to be politically engaged globally. And that does mean I think, active and effective leaders of the European Union, I think we mustn’t retreat from that, we should talk about that, I’ve got some thoughts on that.
We should be absolutely defiant against those who believe that anti-Americanism is a route to make the world a better place. I don’t believe you can solve any of the world’s big problems without the active engagement of the United States.
We should celebrate and build on the historic links that we have with countries like India. I mean, I made a point when I was first minister for schools and then when I was secretary of state for the environment of going to India. I went there because I thought politicians of my generation who didn’t understand what the world looked like through Indian eyes weren’t going to understand the world very well, and what I saw there was a relationship between two countries that obviously had a colonial history, had genuinely become a partnership of equals.
And in the period between my visit as minister for schools and secretary of state for the environment, India became an investor into the UK. That is one definition of a partnership of equals. And we are a P5 member. And I think those are obviously responsibilities, but those are huge opportunities to us and we bring the strengths of this office to bear on them.
FT: What we thought we’d do, and we’d like to talk about your overall philosophy, so we’ve started with that. But what we thought we’d like to do is have a little bit of a talk about sort of key areas if we can, and then maybe sort of come back to that. Starting off with the Middle East, now on Wednesday, you said you fully acknowledged the “crucial role” played by Hamas in the Alan Johnston release. To what extent does that imply softening the demands that the quartet is making before engagement with Hamas can take place? To what extent are you pointing towards something like that?
DM: It doesn’t at all, and it’s very important that you see what I said on Tuesday in the House of Commons, I obviously didn’t know on Tuesday that Alan Johnston was going to be released but I was probed very hard about what attitude we should be taking, and I chose my words very carefully on Wednesday in respect of the role Hamas played. Which was to recognise it, but equally to be, well, you’ll see the words I used, but I was very clear about our commitment to the quartet principles, about our… the view we took and the fact that 127 Palestinians or 130 Palestinians had been killed in violence in Gaza, and the overthrow of the government. And so the short answer to your question is, it doesn’t.
FT: We never demanded of the IRA that it recognised Northern Ireland’s right to exist. We demanded it recognised the reality of Northern Ireland and that reality couldn’t be overturned by violence. Why do we demand of Hamas that it recognises the right of Israel to exist, rather than the reality of Israel’s existence?
DM: Well, I think the first thing I’d say, and I was actually asked about this on Tuesday as well, where one can learn lessons, let’s learn lessons around the world, but let’s be careful not to produce a one-for-one export of a political model from one part of the world to another part of the world, both of them with deeply complex histories and problems associated with them.
And the quartet principles were carefully worked out. I think that they set a basic benchmark for being an engaged player. We worked with the national unity government in the occupied Palestinian territories under the previous administration, we did so with those members of it who were committed to work in a peaceful way.
And I think that, I said on Tuesday that I thought the bedrock of the UK government’s approach to the Middle East and specifically the future of relations between Israel and a future Palestinian state were threefold.
First, the two-state solution is something that we have to keep on reiterating our support for and not least in the context of what’s happened over the last three or four weeks. It’s nearly 40 years since the passage of Resolution 242. We’ve got to remain faithful to that.
Secondly, we’ve got to support the efforts of those who are peacemakers and those committed to peaceful processes, and thirdly we’ve got to engage in an economic social and humanitarian agenda. And I think in the short term that yields some very, very clear priorities, not least to support prime minister Fayyad and president Abbas in building Palestinian institutions that can represent the aspirations of all the Palestinian people.
FT: Can I ask, to follow up on that, the quartet principles are to a certain extent, a matter of interpretation, particularly recognising Israel. There are those who say that if you abide by Oslo, Oslo itself recognises Israel, and therefore you are indirectly recognising Israel. But one can have an element of leeway and flexibility. And there are also those who say “but if you don’t engage with people like Haniyeh and people have shown that they can exercise a measure of restraint in Gaza, as evidenced by and control is evidenced by the release of Johnston, you really risk Hamas becoming much more bloody, moving much more to the Jihadic school of thought, and becoming a more kind of little rogue state in which al-qaeda could flourish”. Are you not worried that sticking to an inflexible set of quartet principles means that you have a deepening pit of anarchy in Gaza?
DM: Well everybody wants to avoid a deepening pit of anarchy, as you put it. Every single state and every single person in the region has got a huge interest in avoiding that. Equally, the quartet principles ask for a basic measure of engagement and that’s why I say that the first part of the bedrock of our approach is a commitment to a two-state solution, you’ve probably got tired of people saying it. But actually, given that we’ve got a very clear idea of what the final political end game can be in this, to pretend that the flexibility is about that – and you talked about flexibility – to suddenly say that there’s flexibility about one of the two states having been there at all, I think is not a sensible way of proceeding.
FT: Can we move on to Iran at this point, just sticking with the Middle East? I mean, Iran clearly on the way to developing its nuclear capability. In broad terms, what should the policy response be? Is your broad inclination now that the next step should be to toughen sanctions, or do you think that the emphasis should be more on finding some kind of other diplomatic solutions which bring Iran into a deeper conversation with the West?
DM: Well, I think that’s a false choice, would be my instinct on that. Iran has every right to be a secure, rich country. It doesn’t have the right to set off a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, and it doesn’t have the right to undermine the stability of its neighbours. And that’s why I think the E3 plus three approach, and you can choose your own metaphor, but it makes a very clear offer to the Iranians with big gains for them, as well as having sanctions if they defy the international community.
And I think that part of the answer to one of the first questions I was asked, which was the nature of our alliances, those are multilateral alliances that we take very, very seriously, and that I take very, very seriously. And I think two UN Security Council resolutions is very significant, I think they’ve sent a very clear signal, more than a signal, they are powerful levers, and I think that they present some clear choices for the Iranian leadership.
FT: However, Iran has, despite the fact that the sanctions have been agreed, despite that the US and EU are united with Russia, despite the fact that the Iranian economy is hurting, Iran is continuing with this programme. And people expect at some point this year, it will have 3,000 centrifuges. ElBaradei said this on a number of occasions, it’s been adding centrifuges throughout this year, it started from none in the main facility operating it, it now has got 1,300. If it had 3,000 centrifuges, it could conceivably get enough nuclear material for a bomb within a year. Are you not worried that we need to re-look at the balance between the stick and the carrot in our current approach, given that nothing that we’ve done so far, has slowed them down. We’ve made them hurt, but nothing we’ve done so far has made them reconsider the longstanding strategic decision to go for the nuclear option.
DM: Well, there’s a separate discussion to be had about the extent to which, what has it slowed down, and how has it slowed down, and what effect has it had since 2003, and while we can get into that, I don’t particularly want to. I don’t want to leave on the record that it’s necessarily 100 per cent correct what you’ve said, but leave that to one side. We are ready to work with our partners on a third resolution, we think it’s very, very important that the international community remains clear and united on this issue, and I think there’s a very clear offer on the table for the Iranians.
FT: What do you think of Iran’s complicity in attacks on British soldiers in Basra?
DM: Well, I think that any evidence of Iranian engagement there is to be deplored. I think that we need regional players to be supporting stability, not fomenting discord, never mind death. And as I said at the beginning, Iran has a complete right, and we support the idea that Iran should be a wealthy and respected part of the future. But it does not have the right to be a force of instability.
FT: Just to be clear, there is evidence?
DM: Well no, I chose my words carefully…
FT: I know, but I’m now asking you.
DM: Well as you know, we are very careful about what we say about these things.
FT: And military action? Is it conceivable?
DM: I think that the whole of the international community wants a non-military diplomatic solution to this problem.
FT: So it’s inconceivable?
DM: Sorry?
FT: Military action is inconceivable?
DM: I stand totally foursquare behind what the prime minister has said on this, which is that we want a non-military solution to this, we are working very hard to achieve a non-military solution to this. I don’t think it does any good to speculate any wider than that. Our intent and our actions and our efforts are absolutely clear about the way we want to solve this.
FT: But you’d understand that people might interpret that as leaving all options on the table?
DM: I think that people should… I hope that people will come to see that they should look carefully at the words I use, and they should look at what I say, not at what I don’t say.
FT: On Iraq, if we can turn to that, the prime minister’s made clear there will be no immediate change in policy on the ground, but how long should the troops be there, in your view?
DM: Well, as you say, the prime minister made that clear. To state the obvious, it is a difficult and dangerous situation, that faces our troops and it’s a difficult and dangerous job that they are doing, and in all my reports and instincts, in a brilliant way.
We have handed over power in three provinces as you know. There is a fourth province with a decision to be taken about provisional Iraqi control over the summer. We announced last February the next stage of our shift from 5,700 to 5,000 troops.
And I can see what you’re driving at, and what people drive at, which is they want to make sure there’s sufficient pressure, the argument is timelines, put pressure on the Iraqi government. But equally I think they’ve got to see that artificial timelines give advantage to the other side, and so I think that the principle that we’ve laid as the foundation of our policy, which is that as Iraqi capacity is built up, we hand over to Iraqi control, I think is sensible. And I think that’s a better way, a more convincing way forward. And I spoke to the Iraqi foreign minister and I think that they see that cooperation as being the right way of proceeding.
FT: It’s been written in the press that you were never terribly keen on the war. Is that true?
DM: Well, I think that all sorts of things get written about what I think, so the first thing I’d say is, when I’ve said something on the record, that’s what I think. If it’s not in quotes, then you should deal with what I say in quotes. In respect of the original decision, I voted to support the government’s position, I don’t resile from that. I think anyone would say to you that the decision was a balance between the risks of action and the risks of inaction, the risk for the international community, and I stand by that.
FT: Just on Iraq, how important will the US military’s assessment of the success of the surge in September be for determining the overall international effort? Do you expect there to be a serious assessment of whether these large scale troop presences throughout Iraq is a sensible way to go ahead?
DM: Well look, the assessment that people are looking at is what the so-called surge is doing in Baghdad. No one I’ve heard suggests it isn’t serious, I mean, you use the word is it serious, of course it’s serious, it’s a serious assessment that’s going on. But we’re obviously focused on our troops down in the south, so it’s a different situation.
FT: Do you think there should be an acceleration in the UK of the debate about what went wrong, particularly as far as the planning is concerned?
DM: I haven’t seen any lack of debate about that, if I may put it that way.
FT: Well, obviously there is a lot of debate about it, you’ve taken my question literally. But from the government’s point of view, there are obviously demands for an official inquiry.
DM: Yeah. Look, we’ve got troops there, in a situation which I’ve already said is difficult and dangerous. I think that the vast majority of British people would think that the first priority for British government should be the safety of our troops, the work that they’re doing. I think we can look at questions of inquiries later, but that’s not where I’m spending my time in my first week. I think my priority has got to be what’s the position of our troops and what’s the role of political, social, economic as well as military capacity there.
And I think it’s important, it probably won’t find its way in to what you’re writing, but as a reflection, I think the fact that the commitment that exists from Des Browne and Douglas Alexander and myself to our three departments, living out in reality what we call the comprehensive strategy, is very, very strong. We have met, we will continue to meet as a threesome. We’re determined that our three departments are really playing to each other’s strengths, and I think it’s important to say that.
FT: How much of a portion of attention should people give to the risks of this becoming a regional conflict, how much of a concern is that, the risks of spill over, both in terms of Jihadism, secessionism, refugees and so on? There have been some noises in the US that this is something that people should concentrate on more as we go ahead.
DM: Say more about that.
FT: Well, for example, Brookings says that what one needs to do is think more about safe havens, about border presences and so on. We’ve got Jordan overwhelmed by a refugee population, there are the attendant risks of Islamic extremism, of social disruption, we have concerns also with Turkey and Kurdistan.
DM: I mean, look, in the same way that I say… you can’t say that we live in an interdependent world and then not… interdependence means something. It means something for us, because terrorism can hit us and we could have a separate discussion about that, but of course one’s got to be concerned, both about the situation within Iraq, and about where it sits in the region. It would be odd if I said I was concerned about the situation within Iraq, but I wasn’t concerned about the situation on its borders.
FT: Do you think Iraq has become an incubator for terrorism?
DM: Incubator is a particular sort of adjective.
FT: Noun. I chose it deliberately.
DM: It is a scene of terrorism, I think that’s different from being an incubator of terrorism. There’s clearly terrorism taking place there. I think one’s got to be… I don’t leap to that conclusion about the incubator. I’m not persuaded of that.
FT: No more on Iraq, shall we move on to just one more area for our tour de raison?
DM: You’re choosing all the places that I’ve asked for briefings on.
FT: Russia. Have you yet had the formal statement by the Russians that they won’t extradite Lugovoi?
DM: No. As of two or three hours ago, when I last asked, we obviously saw the website posting, but we haven’t had the reply.
FT: But assuming that you do get a clear no from the Russians, how are you going to respond basically, what are the steps ahead?
DM: Well, tempting as it is to tell you first, I think that as you know, the new government has made a very…
FT: Boring?
DM: No, important commitment about who hears first, so tempting as it is, I’m not going to tell you what we’re going to do.
FT: But generally?
DM: Well, it is an extremely serious issue to have the death of a British citizen and obviously we have our independent judicial processes, which led to the CPS extradition request, and we will deal with it with the seriousness with which it deserves.
FT: More generally, the relationship with Russia, which, this apart, is still fairly chilly. How do you reflect on that? Given that Russians have shown that they want to have a new start post-Blair, is that something that you’d respond to?
DM: Look, I spoke to the Russian foreign minister last week, it must have been on Friday. He and I were both saying that without prejudice to the interests that we have, we both, the positions we have, where it’s on the record where we have disagreements, it’s very important that we find ways to work together in areas where we can agree.
And I know that on issues like climate for example, which is something that Margaret Beckett made a real drive on in the foreign office and which I’m determined to continue, we have very strong interest.
So we’ve got to be a country that seeks productive relations with important countries like Russia and it would be foolish of me not to seek that. But equally we’ve got to be straight with each other as well. About our own positions.
FT: So as far are you’re concerned there is no change from the stance that was taken by Tony Blair… towards Russia over the last few years?
DM: I don’t know what you mean by that. I mean, I obviously see records of discussions and things; you have your own reporting of them. I went with the then prime minister to St Petersburg in 2000 to meet the then candidate Putin and the need for the UK and Russia to find common ground remains strong. And as it happens despite all of the travails, the economic ties between the Russia and the UK get stronger and stronger. There are strains there as well but they [the ties] get stronger.
FT: The question here is how robust are you prepared to be in defending Britain’s interests against a Russia now which is pretty assertive. For examples like missile defence where we have been very clearly hand in glove with the United States are you prepared to maintain that pretty robust defence?
DM: I started out by saying to you that I thought foreign policy had an important part to play in fulfilling the new prime minister’s definition of our national interest and our definition of what it means to be a successful country.
For me to sit here and say, no, we’re not going to take a robust view of our national interest would be a ridiculous thing to do. But equally what I say – and Gordon has been very, very robust about this – judge us by our actions, we’re not going to be in a situation where we ask people to judge us by our rhetoric, they’re going to judge us by our actions.
FT: We haven’t changed our policy of missile defence?
DM: We have not changed our policy of missile defence, of course we are going to be a robust defender of our national interest but what I would say to British readers of your newspaper – but also foreign readers of your newspaper – is that my assessment is judge people by what they do, not just by what they say, and that is the approach I will take to my relations with other countries and I hope that’s the view they will take of us. A lot of foreign policy is saying, but foreign policy where saying is not followed up by doing does not satisfy my definition of robust. It’s easy to be robust in words but let’s see ‘robust’ in deeds.
FT: So just on that question of deeds and on this issue we are, we remain keen to co-operate with the Americans in developing missile defence?
DM: Needless to say it’s important that I say this, I mean, I’ve just said that the FCO and MOD and DFID are working well together. This is an MOD lead obviously so it’s important that we put that on the record. We have not changed our position.
FT: On Kosovo are you worried at all about Russian intransigency, we’ve been talking about the relationship with Russia, there have been active negotiations with Russia the whole of this year and Russia hasn’t changed it’s position at all. The Albanians had hoped the state of Kosovo would be sorted out last year and we’re now entering the summer, it could be a long stressful period, are you worried about the Russian inflexibility on that score?
DM: I don’t want to isolate Russian inflexibility as the source of my worry about Kosovo. I would be worried if the international community could not ensure that the Ahtissari work – which went on for 15 or 16 months, and which in our view was extremely serious and extremely well done – I would be worried if we did not follow through on the important work that Ahtissari did.
FT: In any kind of time line? Would you be worried if we didn’t do that by the end of the summer?
DM: I’m not going to go down to that level. There are obviously discussions going on at the moment about this but the Ahtissari work, it’s very important that we build on that, don’t go behind it.
FT: That’s a diplomatic way of saying that you believe Kosovo should have its independence.
DM: Is that a compliment to say I’ve been diplomatic? All right. Next.
FT: You said you wanted to say something about Europe. Right at the beginning you said I’ve got something to say.
DM: I hope that wasn’t a drum roll.
FT: It was a soft one, say what you want.
DM: All I wanted to say about Europe is that I’ve been convinced for years that the greatest challenge facing the European Union is about delivery rather than about internal democracy; that the root to respect in European hearts is through delivery, that it’s the delivery deficit rather than the democratic deficit that should be the focus of our attention.
And I think now, with the forthcoming IGC, with the mandate that was produced at the European council, we have a unique opportunity for the European Union to get beyond the institutional questions and the institutional debates that flummox and infuriate and bore ordinary members, you know, real people, and get on to the things that could excite them whether it be energy security or climate security or jobs. And I think we’ve got a real responsibility as well as an opportunity to seize that opportunity.
And that will be the focus and the drive of our engagement with European partners and I think a real opportunity. My sense around Europe is that that’s what foreign ministers and environment ministers and prime ministers want to get on with.
FT: On those three issues as we move beyond the institution issues and climate security and jobs, now that we’re moving, one hopes, beyond the institutional debate, would it be those three things that you would hope...?
DM: I don’t regret at all saying what I did when I was secretary for the environment, which is EU equals Environmental Union. I still think that has a really important ring to it. If I had to pick one issue that has the moral and political and economic salience as great as those issues of peace and war in the 1950s and the 1960s, in the 21st century it’s climate and the environment.
And if in 15 years time European citizens can say and know that the European Union has been a leading force in shifting the global debate and the European debate and the European action and the global action about the environment, then the European Union will be a stronger place and it will be more respected and more admired both within its borders and beyond. And the fact that I’ve become foreign secretary reinforces that.
And I think what Margaret did in terms of saying climate is a foreign policy issue not just an environment issue is absolutely right. Miliband’s first law of climate change is that you’ve got to get it out of the hands of environment ministers and into the hands of prime ministers, finance ministers and foreign secretaries. And so there you go. I’m not taking Hilary Benn’s department away from him, I’ve said it before and I still think that that’s something really to build on and there were some people who were sceptical about the drive we put behind the Security Council debate etc.
FT: What about other dimensions of Europe for example; what about CFSP, what about developing Europe, for example we have seen ... doesn’t have a coherent policy towards Russia? Europe has a policy towards the Middle East which consists of turning up at quartet meetings. There was a move with St Malo at the beginning of it when you were still in Number 10 to give it more coherence. Do you see Europe’s foreign policy dimension as well as environment warranting security or jobs?
DM: Well I think first of all they’re linked not separate. And so the economic magnet that membership of the European Union, for example, provides also has foreign policy implications. And I think that the magnet that the European Union provides to Turkey, for example, has very obvious and very direct foreign policy implications for – not just foreign policy – actually, policy implications for demonstrating not just our commitment but our ability to forge a real engagement with millions of Muslims around the world who want to live peacefully and co-operatively with the rest of the world. And that’s an important thing to do.
Secondly, assuming the IGC goes through, we’ve new foreign policy architecture, that’s very Euro speak, isn’t it? We’ve got new systems and institutions that come out of them. We’ve got to make them work. So yes, that’s important. And it will be good for you to challenge me over the years ahead. We’ve insisted rightly in my view about unanimity as the basis for foreign policy decision making. And we’ve got to make sure that it delivers and that’s a reasonable thing for you to challenge me on as we go by.
FT: The United States, is it the single most important alliance?
DM: I think it’s an absolutely vital part of our foreign policy. I think that people have tried to force a choice between Europe and America for a long time but actually John Kennedy got this right, a strong Europe is actually in America’s interests not against America’s interests. I don’t want to rise to that diplomatically and delicately put forced choice.
FT: From the foreign office white paper it says the United States is the single most important bilateral relationship. I would just ask you if you agree with it.
DM: As a bilateral relationship that’s obviously true. I don’t consider our relationship with the European Union to be a bilateral relationship. We’re members of the European Union.
FT: So we’re part of Europe in an alliance with the United States.
DM: We’re certainly part of Europe and we must remain an important part of Europe. I believe that a strong Europe is good for Britain and I think Britain could help lead that. I think that a strong Europe is in the interests of the United States. I also think the bilateral, and it’s right that you use that word, the bilateral links that exist between Britain and the United States are very, very important. Europe and the United States together account for two thirds of global GDP.
That is an absolutely vital opportunity to do good in the world and it is a critical responsibility to do good in the world. If you can’t do good in the world when you’re controlling two thirds of global GDP you’ve really got to be asking hard questions about yourselves. And that’s why I say, and I said it unprompted before, if you look at any of the big problems in the world you need an active relationship with the United States. I went to junior high school in the United States, I went to graduate school in the United States, that’s why I said earlier anyone who thinks they can do good by being anti-American isn’t really serious about tackling…
FT: Do you speak any other European languages?
DM: Not well. I don’t know if you’ve already seen Le Monde is now delivered to the foreign secretary’s office but my French is not great. It’s sort of, it used to be passable, I think it’s passable at the level of comprehension but not passable at the level of speaking. I was terrible at languages really.
FT: So when you hear people in the Labour party say, God, it’s time we had an independent foreign policy, that’s all just sort of nonsense really.
DM: Well we should of course decide our foreign policy in the national interest. I believe very strongly that the British national interest is to be an active and leading member of the European Union; I believe it’s equally in the British national interest to have full engagement with the United States. People have been trying to drive a wedge in this for a very long time. And we’re in the mad position now, or at least some of our opponents are, they want to be not just anti European or anti American they want to be both anti European and anti American. I think that really doesn’t get you anywhere. So I feel no difficulty about saying that we should be leading members of the EU and we should be critical – not critical – vital partners of US. Critical has a double entendre.
FT: At the end of the day were we not too uncritical of the US administration under Tony Blair?
DM: I think you don’t… Diplomacy is partly about what you say in public and it’s partly about what you say in private. And the results come from the combination of what you do in public and what you do in private. And I think it’s too easy to – I don’t believe in gesture politics full stop. I think gesture politics in foreign policy is particularly reprehensible, reprehensible is the wrong word – wrong headed. So it just speaks for itself really.
FT: Just following up on that. The criticisms of Blair weren’t just the public statements, the criticisms were that you didn’t pursue those issues perhaps vigorously enough in the bilateral meetings with Bush and… that you didn’t see the US really pushing it.
DM: That’s alleged by all the people that weren’t there. So they’re speaking from a position of great expertise on it. In the end it’s outcomes that count – it’s outcomes that count. And you’ll be able to make a judgement. You were talking about climate earlier, do we get a global deal in 2012 or not? If we do, the previous prime minister’s work over the last two years to get the US committed to a global deal will be seen in a different light than if post 2012 we haven’t got a deal. So you know, as the man said, let history judge. I think that’s a better way of doing it.
FT: Just to get one thing clear, a lot of people say that you spoke up very strongly in cabinet last July over the fact that Tony Blair wasn’t pressing for a ceasefire in the Lebanese war against Israel. What exactly happened there? Did you disagree with the line being taken by Tony Blair?
DM: It would be ridiculous for me to start providing almost a real time diary on what goes on in cabinet meetings and I’m not going to do that, it would be quite wrong for me to do that. I said one thing on the record about the Lebanon war, I said it in the New Statesman last September, I don’t resile from that but I’m not going to get into what I did or didn’t say. This isn’t a personal – you personalised it, the question round about the prime minister. That’s not what it’s about, this isn’t a personalised thing, it’s about big and difficult and substantive issues.
FT: There’s been a change of language on terrorism. Does that signal a change of approach or policy?
DM: What’s the change of language? I don’t want to sign up to a proposition without knowing. You can ask me what I think.
FT: Well, for example we’ve been told that this government isn’t going to use the phrase, war on terrorism, as a matter of policy. That Number 10, the Number 10 spokesperson has come out and said as a matter of policy we’re not using “war on terrorism”. So that wasn’t a policy before so there’s a change of language.
DM: People have been discussing this rightly in the context of last weekend’s events and how they were, I think, very, very well handled.
I think my reflection on this is that over the last 15, 18 months maybe, I think the debate about the nature of the terrorist threat has changed; the debate has change in an important way. And I think that the centre of gravity in the public and political debate has changed to highlight the specific nature of what is sometimes called an Islamist threat, or an Islamist approach, and to distinguish that as a particular set of actions that are done in the name of Islam, and to distinguish that from a range of other political positions. And I think that is an important development and a correct development. There’s some bloke [Philip Stephens], I don’t know who he is, but he writes these articles every Tuesday and Friday in the FT. He’s got this article today and it’s very good, it makes exactly the right points. And what you do in the last two columns of your article today reflects the shift of gravity. And I think, and I haven’t committed it to memory but you’re right basically in the way that you describe this.
It raises, as you reflect in the piece that one’s got to be careful, one’s then got to tease out the nature of the relationships that exist between different sets of conflicts but there is – I think you are right to say that there is a distinctive narrative associated with those committing acts of terrorism that needs to be understood in and of itself. Do you see what I mean?
And I think that is important. And I think Ruth [Kelly] did a lot of tease that out when she was in communities and local government for the last 15 or 18 months and I think the whole public discourse has changed. Maybe you weren’t there 15 or 18 months ago but I think that’s important.
We should deal with the issue of a two state solution between Israel and Palestine because it’s the right thing to do, it may also… achieving it would take away one of the issues that is used by those that are committing acts of terrorism, it would take that prop away from them.
We should understand that – in and of itself – that won’t remove the terrorist threat because that issue of rhetoric about it is being used by those that commit acts of terrorism to augment their own narrative. But their own narrative has a distinctive ideological core to it and we’ve got to understand that.
Phil knows this and James knows this, I’ve been going on and on for a long time about sense of disempowerment the people in this country feel about things. Powerlessness. Brzezinski has got this phrase that just leapt out at me; throughout human history the power to control has been greater than the power to destroy; now the power to destroy is greater than the power to control. That is a profound point. That is a deeply profound point, I think.
And when I talked at the beginning about thinking through how to maximise the opportunities of globalisation and minimise the threats, the risks I think I said, that is a profound point.
FT: Just to sum up because we’ve covered an enormous range. Overall what is the sort of message that you want to get across in this interview, this first interview, if there’s one kind of...?
DM: “Miliband says Britain must not retreat from the world.” Can you manage that? Is that too long? Britain must not retreat from being a global player.
I feel that very, very strongly and I think that stems from a very clear view of the sort of country Gordon Brown is trying to build on the one hand and on the other hand the nature of the interdependence between domestic policy and foreign policy.
And at the junction box of domestic policy and international policy, I think, sits the foreign office, because the foreign office is there to help use British assets to build a better world but it’s also there to harness the markets because we’ve got the trade and investment arms, the aspirations, the cultures of the world to build a better Britain. And I would just say one final thing which I don’t know if you want to put in but I think is relevant to this.
I know the previous prime minister was a huge admirer of the talent of the foreign office but I think, I don’t think he’d think he got the most out of it and I think part of my job is to make sure that Gordon Brown gets the most out of it and that’s what he wants me to do and that’s what I want to try and do.