Sri Lankan crisis
Sort out the mess before it affects India
by Maj-Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd)

National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan’s
uncharacteristic and unprecedentedly blunt
message to Sri Lanka over seeking military
supplies from China and Pakistan was aimed
equally at them. After his meeting with Chief
Minister M. Karunanidhi last month on the
security of the Tamil Nadu coastline and Indian
fishermen, in an interaction with the media, he
reminded Lanka that “we are a big power in
the region. We don’t want the Sri Lankan
government (SLG) to go to Pakistan or China.
Whatever be their requirements, they should
come to us”. He added that India would
determine the needs and supply only defensive
weapons.
Pakistan spokesperson Tasneem Aslam was
quick to note India’s “hegemonistic
tendencies” and failure to respect sovereign
equality of the countries in the region.
Compared to Sri Lanka’s subdued official
response, there was an uproar in Colombo
among the Sinhalese parties and retired service
chiefs. Former Army Commander Gen
Hamilton Wanasinghe said: “Pakistan and
China have helped us in critical times. India
should not tell us they created the LTTE.”
This is the first time an Indian official has
publicly ticked off Sri Lanka over what is
apparently a country’s sovereign right — to
choose and purchase weapons from outside.
In an interview with Business Standard last
week, Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee
said: “When we are prepared to help Sri
Lanka, why is there talk of going to others for
help ?”
In 1988, Nepal had dared to skirt an MOU
with India on arms purchase by importing anti
-aircraft guns from China clandestinely. This
led to an economic blockade by India which
triggered the movement for the restoration of
democracy. While acknowledging India as
“our closest friend,” the public reaction in
Colombo amounted to telling India not to
dictate terms. The message was clear: we will
transact with countries that meet our
requirement. It hinted that while Delhi
periodically reiterates its commitment to the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri
Lanka, it does not entirely meet its obligation.
Ever since the fall of Elephant Pass to the
LTTE in 2000, New Delhi has been
ambivalent about military support to Colombo.
The situation in May 2000 in the Jaffna
peninsula came to such a pass that the Sri
Lankan government pleaded for military
assistance in the event its military garrison had
to be evacuated. But India gave no assurance.
Instead of providing tanks, guns and aircraft as
sought, India agreed to provide economic aid
and a line of credit for $100 m. The
compulsions of coalition politics denied New
Delhi any credible option in defusing the crisis.
Sri Lanka was forced to turn to Pakistan for
the crucial multibarrel rocket launcher which
saved Jaffna from being overwhelmed by the
LTTE. Sri Lanka refers to Pakistan as a friend
and saviour. It is the reflection of our
diplomacy that after helping Sri Lanka in
crushing a JVP insurrection in 1971, Colombo
permitted the Pakistan Air Force to refuel its
aircraft en route to East Pakistan prior to the
showdown.
The India-Sri Lanka Defence Cooperation
Agreement (DCA) has been in the pipeline for
six years. Many Defence Secretaries and
Chiefs of Defence Staff from Colombo have
had countless discussions with their
counterparts in South Block but the DCA was
allowed to die a natural death. Lanka, though,
has not stopped asking for tanks, guns and
aircraft and India has not budged from its
policy of providing only defensive weapons
like radars, mine protection vehicles, body
armour and offshore patrol vessels. The Indian
High Commissioner in Colombo has
repeatedly told the Sri Lankan government that
only defensive weapons are on offer and
Colombo should keep off China and Pakistan.
Events leading to the present episode began
with Mahinda Rajapakse assuming presidency
in 2005. On his first visit to New Delhi in
2006, he gave Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh a list of military requirements.
As there was no response from the PMO to
the President’s wish list, Mr Rajapakse rang
up Dr Singh and sent his brother, Defence
Secretary Gothabaya Rajapakse, at least twice
to Delhi where he met the usual lineup — the
Defence Secretary, the Service Chiefs, the
Defence Minister and Mr Narayanan. It
appears he could not obtain a clear response
to the President’s list. It was, as is usually the
case, neither yes, nor no though Delhi had
indicated through its High Commissioner in
Colombo some difficulty in supplying offensive
weapons. Yet President Rajapakse, during his
second meeting earlier this year with Dr Singh,
reminded him of the list he had given him.
Back in Delhi, in the wake of last month’s
Tiger air attacks and amphibious assault on
Delft Island, Mr Gothabaya Rajapakse met
Mr Narayanan and reportedly told him that his
country needed weapons “other than
defensive” urgently — a request he and his
President had made several times over —
failing which they would be forced to approach
China and Pakistan, an option they had
exercised earlier. According to Sri Lankan
sources, Defence Secretary Rajapakse
explained the LTTE’s air threat as well as the
latest amphibious attack on Delft Island and
appealed for Indian intelligence inputs as well
as a naval blockade for sea denial of the
LTTE. This extraordinary request and an
ultimatum to buy weapons from China and
Pakistan rattled Mr Narayanan and led to his
plain-speaking not from Delhi but Chennai.
Over time, the activation of the Delhi-Chennai
-Colombo network has assumed a familiar
pattern. Refugee arrivals from Lanka and
casualties among Lanka Tamils in the East or
Indian fishermen in Palk Straits raise the
political temperature in Chennai. Mr
Karunanidhi reacts by first calling Dr Singh and
then travelling to Delhi to make the right noises
with the top leadership, including Mr
Narayanan. This is followed by Mr Narayanan
going to Chennai and meeting Tamil Nadu
leaders. When the situation warrants, the
Foreign Secretary travels to Colombo,
invariably making a reaffirmation of India’s
commitment to Sri Lanka’s unity, sovereignty
and territorial integrity.
While sticking to the pattern this time, Mr
Narayanan deviated from the script by
circumscribing Sri Lanka’s autonomy. Among
other things, he said, “we will give whatever
(weapons) we think is necessary”, and added:
“We are not involved in Sri Lanka’s war but
we are deploying assets for our own security.”
There is considerable confusion still over
coordinated patrolling between the Sri Lankan
and Indian Navies. Defence Minister AK
Antony said in Singapore last week: “India has
made no commitment for coordinated
patrolling at this stage” though Mr Narayanan
has favoured establishing a unified command.
All these problems, including the threat to India
from Sea and Air Tigers, was discussed at a
high-level security briefing last week chaired
by the Defence Minister.
India’s advocacy of defensive weapons is
designed to discourage a military solution
which Sri Lanka is pursuing in the guise of
fighting terrorism, since many Sinhalese
contend there is no ethnic conflict any more.
They believe it is imperative to weaken the
LTTE militarily before engaging them in any
talks. This is a myth being perpetuated by the
Rajapakse regime.
As India has underwritten Sri Lanka’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity, it has the
moral responsibility to sort out the mess in that
country which endangers its own security.
Source: TribuneIndia, Bala